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Academics and journalists tell us that we are currently witnessing a historic
event: the demise of career-type jobs. Richard Sennett, the sociologist, argues
eloquently that the surge of corporate downsizing is the signal occurrence
of our postmodern age, with ramiWcations far beyond the labor market. As
careers condense, so do our time horizons and relationships. What Sennett
(1998) calls “no long term” is a pervasive force eroding our moral strength.
“No long term,” he says, “disorients action over the long term, loosens
bonds of trust and commitment, and divorces will from behavior.”
Many Americans remain anxious about job security. The share of em-
ployees who say they are frequently concerned about layoffs has risen from
12 percent in 1981 to 37 percent this year (Daily Labor Report 1999). Politi-
cians are adept at tapping into these sentiments, as in the 1996 presidential
campaign, when Patrick Buchanan excoriated executives for taking huge
salaries while laying off thousands of workers. President Clinton responded
predictably: he organized a conference and invited employers to the White
House to discuss corporate ethics and responsibilities (Mandell 1996;
Mitchell 1996).
The notion that corporations have responsibilities to employees is hardly
a new or radical idea. Its roots lie deep in the American past, dating back
a century or more when companies Wrst began systematically to provide
for their employees’ welfare. The movement was known as “welfare work”
or “welfare capitalism.” It was not unique to the United States, but its pop-
ularity in this country was uniquely American. Welfare capitalism shaped
our nation’s risk-sharing institutions — everything from “fringe” beneWts to
Social Security to career employment — the same institutions whose future
is being questioned by Sennett and others (Jacoby 1997).
Yet institutional arrangements have changed much less than Sennett’s
“no long term” would suggest. Put bluntly, the welfare capitalist approach
remains in place. Career-type employment practices — an amalgam that
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economists term “internal labor markets” — are still the norm in the labor
market and employers continue to shoulder a variety of risks for employees.
None of this is to deny the labor-market turbulence of the past Wfteen years.
The mixture of market and organizational principles that structures the
employment relationship now gives more weight to market factors, espe-
cially in managerial positions. There also has been a change in risk sharing,
with employers transferring more of the burden to employees. However,
these are changes of degree, not of kind. They do not constitute a phase
shift but rather a reallocation of responsibilities within a stable institutional
structure. This chapter discusses the extent of change in recent years and
analyzes the prospects for welfare capitalism’s future.
The Crisis of Welfare Capitalism?
During the past twenty years, modern welfare capitalism has experienced
its most critical test since the Great Depression. Starting in the 1980s, a
series of shocks hit the economy. Heightened competition, rapid techno-
logical change, and corporate mergers led to layoffs throughout American
industry. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, it was blue-collar industrial
workers — often unionized — who bore the brunt of permanent job loss.
Since the late 1980s, it has been white-collar, educated workers who have
experienced the sharpest increases in permanent job loss. Less-educated
workers still have the highest job-loss rates, but their rates have fallen since
the early 1980s. Hence the gap separating the job-loss rates of males with
a high-school education and males with a college education narrowed by
more than half between the early 1980s and the mid-1990s.1 Companies that
had never experienced a major layoff — Wrms like IBM, Kodak, and Digital
Equipment — now jettisoned thousands of white-collar employees.
What is signiWcant about these recent cuts is that they are occurring
during a relatively tight labor market, unlike previous postwar layoffs that
were keyed to the business cycle. Also, recent downsizing disproportionately
affects educated professional and managerial employees, a group not pre-
viously targeted for layoff. The layoffs were — and are — a shock to those
employees who believed themselves immune from job loss. Middle-level
managers found that the elimination of their jobs was often the chief goal
of industrial “restructuring.” At large diversiWed companies, a combination
of mergers, new information technology, and work reorganization reduced
the need for headquarters staff. Fully 85 percent of large multinational cor-
porations report that they have reorganized their headquarters since 1990
(Conference Board 1998). Those who survive downsizing are being offered
a different employment contract. Instead of employment security in exchange
for loyalty, organizations are proffering a “new deal” that provides higher
pay in return for broader skills and a tolerance of change (Herriot and
Pemberton 1995; Cappelli 1999).
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Meanwhile, there has been an expansion of nonstandard employment:
jobs that are temporary, part time, or contractual. In 1997, around 20 per-
cent of all employees held nonstandard jobs. (The self-employed accounted
for another 10 percent; Kalleberg et al. 1997, p. 9.) There is a stratum of
nonstandard workers (such as consultants working on contract) who are
well paid. However, most of these workers are likely to be paid a low wage,
and they are one-sixth as likely to receive health and pension beneWts as
those in standard full-time jobs. In fact, much of the decline in health insur-
ance coverage since 1979 has been the result of cutbacks for temporary and
other peripheral workers. Coverage has also declined for some of those
holding standard jobs, notably less-educated males (Farber and Levy 1998;
Kalleberg et al. 1997; Farber 1997b).
Accompanying these changes has been a new ethos of market individual-
ism, especially in places such as Wall Street and Silicon Valley where there
is intense competition for skilled workers combined with a rapidly changing
knowledge base. These workers — predominantly young and educated —
have grown skeptical not only of welfare capitalism but of government,
unions, and other large institutions. Believing that they must have a broad
range of skills to succeed in today’s labor market, these workers expect to
spend no more than brief stints at any single Wrm. They ask only that the
employer ensure their future employability by providing learning experi-
ences that can be added to their resumes. Less concerned with job security
than the generations who were touched by the Depression, they see them-
selves as masters of their own fates. They resemble nineteenth-century craft
workers, who treasured their autonomy and hedged their labor-market risk
with a diverse set of skills.
These changes have led to a widespread sense that the institutional struc-
tures erected over the course of the last century are tumbling down. It is
hard not to feel that way when no less than the American Management
Association issues a book entitled Corporate Executions, whose subtitle is
“How Corporate Greed Is Shattering Lives, Companies, and Communities”
(Downs 1995). But reports of welfare capitalism’s demise are exaggerated.
We are not moving to an economy made up only of short-term jobs, indif-
ferent employers, and disloyal employees. Mid- to large-size corporations
continue to pursue employment practices that are sheltered from the
momentary vicissitudes of the market. It would be a vast exaggeration to say
that long-term employment is dead or that all jobs henceforth will be casual
positions. “No long term” is hyperbole. “Less long term” is not as catchy
but far more accurate.
It is a human tendency to believe that one lives in an exceptional era, fun-
damentally different from earlier periods. Many people today — including
businessmen, academics, and government leaders — think that information
technology is creating a “new economy” with accelerating innovation and
productivity growth. However, economic statistics show that productivity
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growth today actually is slower than it was during the Wrst two decades after
World War II (Kurtzman 1998: 88).
Just as there is a certain amount of hype attached to rhetoric about the
new economy, there is a tendency to exaggerate how much the labor market
has changed in recent years. The big change, as mentioned, is the fact that
companies are laying workers off during a prosperous period, with layoffs
targeted at white-collar employees. Hence employees today bear more risk,
including a greater risk of layoff. But there are still plenty of career-type
jobs for educated workers, and employers still indemnify employees against
many kinds of risk.
To understand the paradox of continuity amid change, it is important to
recall the distinction between stocks (our endowment of existing jobs) and
Xows (the jobs being created and destroyed in the current period). Just as
in the distinction between the large national debt and the smaller annual
deWcit (or surplus), we sometimes forget that stocks tend to dwarf net Xows.
Moreover, another important fact is that net Xows are composed of two
enormous intersecting streams: job “deaths” (such as downsizing) and job
“births” (new jobs) (Davis and Haltiwanter 1992). Despite downsizing, the
U.S. economy has been adept at maintaining a high birth rate of new jobs,
many of which eventually will become long-term positions. In what follows,
several types of evidence are marshaled in support of these claims, includ-
ing data on employee tenure and mobility, new job creation and new job
quality, cyclical factors, and on employee compensation.
Tenure and Mobility
Take, for example, the data on employee tenure, one indicator for gauging
the prevalence of long-term or career employment. Tenure is not easy to
measure. There are problems in controlling for the effect of the business
cycle and in using cross-sectional as opposed to panel data. Also, there are
biases that arise when individuals round off their self-estimates of tenure.
Nevertheless, recent studies consistently Wnd only a slight drop in the over-
all prevalence of long-term jobs. In the 1980s there was little change in
aggregate job stability ( job retention rates), while in the Wrst half of the
1990s there was a modest decline in stability, particularly for long-tenure
workers (Diebold et al. 1997; Neumark et al. 1998).
For men ages 35–64, the share employed more than ten years with their
current employer fell from 50 percent in 1979 to 40 percent in 1996. The
sharpest tenure declines occurred in managerial and professional-technical
occupations (although managers had and still have the highest probabil-
ity of being in long-term employment relationships). However, during the
same period there was an increase — albeit slight — in the share of those
employed in long-term positions in service occupations and industries.
Partly for this reason, female tenure has shown a different pattern: For
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women aged 35–64, the share employed in long-term positions rose mod-
erately between 1979 and l996 (Farber 1997d). While the rise in female
tenure is partly due to changes in women’s career patterns (they are less
likely to quit for childbearing than in the past), it is important to remem-
ber that employers are responding to women’s growing desire for stable,
career-type positions by providing them with jobs of this kind.
The unadjusted data for the period 1983 to 1998 show similar trends. For
males over 25, the percentage who worked for their current employer for
ten years or more fell modestly from 38 to 33 percent; for women, the per-
centage increased from 25 percent to 28 percent, nearly canceling the drop
in male tenure. In service and retail industries, median tenure rose slightly
between 1983 and 1998; in manufacturing and transportation industries,
median tenure declined slightly.2
What about data on employee separations (layoffs, dismissals, and quits)?
Even if the amount of time people remain on their jobs has not changed
much, it is possible that workers are experiencing less security. This could
be due to higher levels of involuntary job loss as a cause of separations.
Also, it could be reXected in lower levels of voluntary mobility. Unfortu-
nately, there is no consensus on this issue; different data sets tell different
stories. The Displaced Workers Survey focuses on involuntary job loss ( job
loss due to plant closings, position abolished, slack work, and other forms
of layoff ). The survey shows a slight increase in involuntary job loss in the
1990s compared to the 1980s, with most of the increase driven by job loss
for “other” reasons, the nature of which is not clear (Farber 1997a). Data
from the Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID) paint a grimmer picture,
with a steady weakening for male workers — but not female workers — of
the negative effect of tenure on the probability of being dismissed. (That is,
long-tenure male workers stood a greater chance of dismissal; Valletta
1997.)However, another panel study, the Census Bureau’s Survey of Income
and Program Participation (SIPP), shows stability from the mid-1980s to
the mid-1990s in aggregate layoff and discharge rates. The probability of
permanent layoff declined for young (18-35) and middle-aged (41-55) work-
ers, while rising sharply for workers in the 56–60 age bracket.3 
The SIPP data on voluntary mobility (quits) exhibit little change since
the 1980s, meaning that layoffs are neither inhibiting quits nor promoting
them. Survey data show the same thing: of those employed over twenty
hours per week, there was no change between 1977 and 1997 in the pro-
portion who say they will seeks new jobs with other employers in the com-
ing year. Workers, in other words, are neither more nor less inclined to hop
jobs than twenty years ago (Bond et al. 1998; Bansak and Raphael 1998).
Data on geographic mobility provide corroborating evidence. People who
change their residence often change their jobs, especially when a move is
out of state. Richard Sennett’s protagonist, a high-tech venture capitalist,
moved around the country four times in twelve years, leading Sennett to
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lament “the fugitive quality of friendship and local community” caused by
new career patterns. In the suburbs where today’s employees reside, “no
one . . . becomes a long-term witness to another person’s life.” But is it really
the case that Americans are more mobile now than in the 1950s, the heyday
of the Organization Man and the classic bedroom suburb? In fact, they are
not. Cross-state geographic mobility rates actually are slightly lower in the
1990s than they were in the 1950s, when communities and workers allegedly
were more stable.4
In short, the data indicate a very modest decline in aggregate job stabil-
ity in the 1990s, with much of the effect concentrated among long-tenure
males in managerial and professional occupations. The underlying stock of
jobs, however, is still heavily composed of career-type positions. Indeed, as
the population continues to age, it is likely that job tenure levels will rise
across the labor market. Focusing on net Xows over the past Wfteen years,
we see a drop of 1 to 8 percentage points in the proportion employed over
ten years with the same employer; focusing on stocks, we see that nearly
one-third of the adult labor force in 1998 was employed in long-term jobs,
rising to one-half for men aged 45–64. “Long-term employment relation-
ships” says economist Henry Farber (1997: 26), “remain an important fea-
ture of the U.S. labor market.”
Deaths and Births
If one identiWes the U.S. companies with the largest absolute net job losses
since 1990, the list contains many familiar names. Near the top are Sears
(down 166,000 since 1990), AT&T (down 155,000), and IBM (down
113,000). Other major losers include General Motors, General Dynamics,
Digital Equipment (DEC), Kodak, Mobil, and Xerox.5 Job losses at these
blue-ribbon companies send a message that absolute job security no longer
exists. Nevertheless, not all jobs are in peril, nor is modern welfare capital-
ism a relic of the past. Despite laying off thousands of workers, many of these
companies continue to offer career employment and, in some instances,
have been rehiring employees almost as quickly as shedding them. AT&T,
which took a major public relations hit three years ago when it announced
plans to eliminate 40,000 jobs, has had a net reduction of 20,000 jobs since
then because of its new hires (Silverstein and Maharaj 1999). 
Much of this is common knowledge. What is less well known is the extent
to which employment has been reshufXed in recent years, either within in-
dustries (from unproWtable companies to rapidly growing ones) or between
industries (from mature to expanding sectors). There has been a slew of
companies whose headcount grew steadily in the 1990s. European and other
critics of the U.S. employment “miracle” scoff at this new job creation, argu-
ing that it is concentrated in sectors offering low-quality jobs (Freeman
1998). In fact, several of the companies with the largest absolute employment
Are Career Jobs Headed for Extinction? 183
09chap8.qxd  1/8/03  10:41 AM  Page 183
growth since 1990 either offer relatively low-quality jobs — such as Marriott
(up 194,000) and McDonald’s (up 91,000) — or they are purveyors of
temporary workers, like Kelly Services (up 172,000) and Robert Half (up
117,000).
However, the gainers also include companies offering stable, career-type
positions. Those situated in expanding sectors tend to be newer companies
that have not yet become household names. For example, the following
companies each created at least 40,000 jobs since 1990: in Wnancial ser-
vices, Morgan Stanley and Norwest; in health care, Genesis Health Ventures
and Sun Healthcare; and in entertainment, Disney and Viacom. Some of
the better-quality job gainers come from the same industries as those on the
losers list. Thus while Sears shrank, its competitors — like Dayton-Hudson,
Home Depot, Lowe’s, and Wal-Mart — added over 700,000 jobs. In the
communications industry, AT&T contracted but SBC, MCI, Worldcom, and
Motorola added many more jobs than AT&T cut. Gains by EDS, Intel, and
Seagate surpassed losses at DEC and IBM, while even some chemical com-
panies — unlike Kodak — managed to add considerable numbers of new
jobs, including Praxair, Merck, and Eastman Chemical (once a division of
Kodak).
These successful companies put enormous effort into transforming
new recruits into company men and women, both in the way they think and
the skills that they possess. While the new jobs do not provide the kind of
iron-clad security that some employees, especially managers, once could
expect, nevertheless these jobs are far from being short-term positions.
Take, for example, Lowe’s, a chain of home improvement stores. Lowe’s is
very similar to what Sears Roebuck was like in its heyday. The company has
grown rapidly, adding 43,000 jobs and hundreds of new stores since 1990.
Twice listed as one of the country’s top one hundred employers, it offers
career jobs and a stock purchase plan for all of its employees, who own
25 percent of the company. Lowe’s competitors — including Home Depot
and Wal-Mart — similarly pride themselves on their low employee turnover
rates. Wal-Mart, currently on the top one hundred list, promotes from
within and invests heavily in employee training, as does Home Depot. With
new jobs like these, median tenure levels will rise in years to come.6
To Wnd a parallel to the labor market of the 1990s, one has to go back
seventy years. During the 1920s, the unemployment rate was low and new
jobs were rapidly being created. However, the health of the aggregate labor
market masked some painful shifts. One factor fostering job displacement
in the 1920s was a high rate of investment in labor-saving plant and equip-
ment, which gave rise to a new phrase, “technological unemployment.”
Another factor was sectoral dislocation. Employment was shifting from
blue-collar to white-collar jobs; from manufacturing to services; and within
manufacturing from older industries likes steel, shoes, cotton textiles, and
railroad equipment to newer industries like electrical goods, chemicals, and
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food processing. The rate at which workers left the industry in which they
had been employed more than doubled in the 1920s over the rate that had
existed between 1899 and 1914 (Jacoby 1985). During the Great Depres-
sion, contraction of these newer industries was less severe and recovery
more rapid than average; they ultimately were the industries on which the
postwar economy was based (Bernstein 1987). However, the 1920s were,
despite the sectoral shifts, a decade of growing, if unevenly distributed,
prosperity. All of this should sound eerily familiar — absent, one hopes, the
stock-market crash that brought the decade to a close.
Job Quality
What about the quality of today’s new jobs? We can assess job quality using
proxy measures such as real wage growth and full-time status. One study
Wnds that in the early 1980s there was a slight deterioration of real wages on
new jobs relative to old jobs. Since then, however, relative real wages have
been stable. While the less educated suffered sizeable real wage declines,
that pattern occurred in both old and new jobs. Moreover, new jobs of the
mid-1990s fell into the overall wage distribution in much the same way as in
earlier years (Farber 1997a). Thus the evidence is not consistent with the
claim that the new jobs being produced by the U.S. economy are predomi-
nantly low-wage. Wage inequality is pervasive and not the result of inferior
new jobs ( Jacoby and Goldschmidt 1998).
Whether a job is permanent or full time is another dimension of job qual-
ity. Temporary jobs have experienced rapid growth in recent years, faster
than other jobs. However, while growth has been rapid, it started from a
small base. Currently less than 2 percent of the workforce is employed on
a contract basis or works for temporary help agencies. One reason for the
growth in temporary positions is employer reluctance to hire probationary
employees who might have to be dismissed if unsatisfactory. With dismissal
costs rising, employers prefer to use temporary help agencies to screen
persons suitable for career-type positions. (Temp agencies rarely Wre un-
satisfactory workers; they simply stop calling them.) That is, the growth in
temporary positions is, at least in part, a complement to, not a substitute
for, standard full-time employment (Autor 1999).
As for part-timers, some 21 percent of workers are employed part time.
That Wgure is the same as in the early 1970s. Moreover, for the period since
1980, there is no evidence that new jobs are more likely to be part time than
old jobs. Bear in mind that around 80 percent of part-timers are in those
positions voluntarily — they are not seeking full-time jobs — and some have
a signiWcant stake in the companies they work for (Kalleberg et al. 1997;
Segal and Sullivan 1997; Lester 1998).
Growth of nonstandard jobs has leveled off recently. As a share of the
labor force, such employment actually declined slightly since 1995. One
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explanation for this is the recent tightening of labor markets. For those
whose nonstandard employment is involuntary — as is the case for many
temporary workers — such jobs are viewed as an inferior alternative to
regular full-time positions. With the labor market heating up since the
mid-1990s, fewer workers are Wnding themselves having to take these tran-
sitional jobs. To put this another way, labor shortages are forcing employers
to assume greater risk when Wlling positions (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics 1997; Farber 1997a).
Cyclical Factors
Labor markets are affected not only by structural and secular changes,
but also by cyclical factors, such as the unemployment rate. Cyclical and sec-
ular components were difWcult to disentangle when labor markets were
stagnant, as was the case for much of the period since the mid-1970s. How-
ever, the recent drop in unemployment has revealed the limits of a purely
structural perspective. Unemployment rates are lower now than at any time
since 1973, when the monetary authorities Wrst became obsessed with Wght-
ing inXation. In the future, we may well look back at the downsizing of the
1980s and 1990s and see more clearly its relationship to cyclical factors.
Low unemployment has two effects. Directly, it fosters the internalization
of labor markets, as employers seek to retain scarce labor. Indirectly, as
economist Michal Kalecki Wrst observed Wfty years ago, low unemployment
enhances the bargaining power of employees and their ability to get em-
ployers to shoulder risks for them (Kalecki 1971). When labor markets are
slack, power is on the employer’s side; when unemployment rates are low, the
tables are turned and employers are more inclined to accommodate worker
demands. Indeed, it is revealing that Kalecki published his essay during
World War II, a time when labor was scarce and unions strong. During the
hundred-year span from 1870 to 1970, career employment practices did not
grow steadily. Rather, they widened and deepened most rapidly in periods
when unemployment was relatively low, such as the late 1880s, early 1900s,
and the four major wars of this century. Conversely, there were reversions
to more market-oriented employment relationships during slack periods
like the 1890s and 1930s. What happened from the late 1970s through the
early 1990s, then, was the conXuence of relatively slow growth, a loose labor
market, and structural shocks arising from deregulation, globalization, and
sectoral shifts. Historical evidence suggests that any tightening of U.S. labor
markets will — both directly (to retain scarce labor) and indirectly (via bar-
gaining power) — shift employment practices back in the direction of insu-
lation from market forces. We can call this the Kalecki effect (Keyssar 1986).7
Presently, we again are witnessing the Kalecki effect, as unemployment
plummets. Tight labor markets force employers to shed labor more care-
fully and make it easier for workers to Wnd new jobs. That is one reason why
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there has been so little outcry over recent layoffs. Over two-thirds of work-
ers permanently displaced from full-time jobs between 1995 and 1997 have
found reemployment in full-time jobs. An additional 15 percent are work-
ing part time or at home, and 15 percent left the labor market. The total
reemployment rate has risen since the mid-1990s, while wage prospects have
improved. Workers who were laid off in the last two years are much less
likely to be suffering earnings declines than workers laid off in the early
1990s: 38 percent experienced earnings declines in the past two years, ver-
sus 55 percent Wve years ago. However, for some workers — especially the
less educated — job loss was and still is the source of large and persistent
earnings losses.8 
Managers and skilled workers are experiencing especially high re-
employment rates. One headhunting agency recently reported that man-
agers at companies announcing layoff plans often Wnd themselves with
several job offers in hand before the layoffs occur. Hence while organiza-
tions today are somewhat Xatter than before, they still have an enormous
appetite for managers and management remains a growth occupation. The
proportion of managers in the workforce actually increased over the course
of the 1990s, as new employment growth exceeded the volume lost to down-
sizing (Gordon 1996).
As companies scramble for help, they are luring new recruits with offers
of traditional career opportunities. As a recent article put it, “employers are
going to great lengths to persuade employees that they want them to stay
for years” (Business Week 1998). Employers are dusting off and reintroducing
old-style employee development and training programs intended to reas-
sure managers and professionals of their prospects. Citibank, for example,
despite recent layoffs, expects its workforce to grow in coming years. So it
recently established a formal career development program for 10,000 man-
agers. The company’s vice president for human resources said, “We want to
make people feel that they have a long-term career with us” (Daily Labor
Report 1998: C17).
The response to tighter labor markets suggests a swinging pendulum. Em-
ployers today want careers to be less “boundaryless” and more organization-
centered. The problem, of course, is that this runs directly counter to what
today’s educated young workers think is the route to career success: regular
changing of employers to gain experience and to signal ambition. Recently,
I spoke to the vice president for human resources of a Fortune 500 company,
who was lamenting the difWculty of attracting and retaining young man-
agers and professionals. I reminded him that people in their 20s and early
30s were simply responding to the mantra they have heard employers chant-
ing for the last ten years: that everyone should expect to regularly change
jobs, and perhaps even careers, throughout their working lives. “Yes, we’ve
been our own worst enemy,” he said to me. “And now we’ve got to put a new
message out.
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Benefits and Wages
What about fringe beneWts, a tangible sign of an employer’s commitment
to employees? In health insurance, there has been almost no change since
1979 in the proportion of private-sector employers offering health beneWts.
What has changed are the eligibility rules, which have become more strin-
gent for short-term and part-time workers, and the take-up rate, which has
declined for full-time “core” employees due to spousal coverage. Thus the
evidence suggests that “employers are continuing to make health insurance
available to their core long-term full-time employees but are restricting
access . . . by their peripheral employees” (Farber and Levy 1998).9
Pension coverage is a different story. In the 1980s, pension coverage fell
sharply for younger, less educated men — the type of workers who once
were employed in unionized manufacturing jobs. For mature workers and
for college graduates, however, the coverage decline was modest; for women
there was a slight increase in coverage. The situation stabilized in the 1990s.
Between 1991 and 1997, the proportion of workers in mid- to large size
establishments who were covered by a retirement plan rose slightly.10 The
big change, however, has been the shift from deWned beneWt to deWned con-
tribution plans, which is discussed below.
Again, it is important to recall the distinction between stocks and Xows.
Despite modest shifts in coverage, employers remain key elements in our
health and pension systems. Two-thirds of all private-sector workers receive
employer-provided health insurance, rising to 76 percent for those em-
ployed in medium to large establishments (Farber and Levy 1998; U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics various years). As for pensions, 63 percent of
full-time workers and 21 percent of regular part-time workers are covered
by employer-provided retirement plans, with coverage rising to 79 percent
in mid- to large-size establishments. Even as some employers are discontin-
uing particular programs, others are adopting new ones such as preventive
medical care, day care, and other beneWts targeted at employees with depen-
dents. Recently, a group of twenty major corporations pledged to invest mil-
lions of dollars to make child and elder care more available. The companies
included such paragons of modern welfare capitalism as Hewlett-Packard,
IBM, Mobil, and Texas Instruments (Kalleberg et al. 1997; Daily Labor Report
1995).
Another way of assessing where an employer sits on the continuum
between market- and organization-oriented policies is to examine the
extent to which actual pay rates diverge from market rates. Companies that
insulate employment relationships from market forces will be more likely
to engage in wage-smoothing over the course of a long-term employment
relationship; at any point in time, wages will be less sensitive to market con-
ditions than in spot markets. Such companies also are more likely to pay a
wage premium that deviates from market averages. There could be any
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number of reasons for this policy, such as turnover minimization (workers
are less likely to quit high-pay employers) or productivity enhancement
(workers are more diligent when the cost of termination — here, a fall back
to market rates — is high). There is one recent study that Wnds that wages
have become more sensitive to unemployment rates, although the study
uses industry data and is limited to manufacturing industries adversely
affected by foreign competition in the 1980s. On the other hand, another
recent study uses a unique data set covering white- and blue-collar occu-
pations in two hundred large Wrms over the last forty years. It Wnds no
evidence of a decline in the magnitude or persistence of employer wage pre-
mia for individual occupations and groups of occupations. This suggests a
high degree of stability in the way employers base their long-term wage
strategies on organizational rather than market considerations (Bertrand
1999; Groshen and Levine 1998).
Explaining the Paradox
To summarize, a variety of sources have been examined to assess the degree
of change in career-type employment practices. Blue-collar workers in the
early 1980s and white-collar workers in the early 1990s experienced higher
levels of permanent job loss. As a result, aggregate job tenure rates have
declined modestly since the late 1970s. On the other hand, the majority of
workers continue to hold career-type jobs that offer fringe beneWts, training,
and prospects of continuity. For women and for those in service occupa-
tions and industries, long-tenure employment has become more prevalent
over the last twenty years. Also, the economy is creating new jobs that
are predominantly neither low-wage nor part-time. Hence the majority of
displaced workers are Wnding reemployment in career-type positions. The
recent decline in unemployment rates has boosted prospects for displaced
workers and strengthened employer reliance on career-type practices.
Taken as a whole, the evidence does not show a radical slide to the mar-
ket pole of the organizational-market continuum. Organizational consider-
ations still trump market logic for the bulk of the economy’s jobs, and the
majority of employers continue to shoulder income and employment risks
for employees. How, then, does one explain the disparity between the per-
ception of “no long term” and the fact that stability remains widespread in
the labor market? There is no simple answer to this question, but expla-
natory elements can be found in cognitive psychology and the politics of
punditry.
Perceptual Biases
A stream of research in cognitive psychology documents the pervasiveness
of loss aversion: People weigh losses — like layoffs — more heavily than
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gains (Kunreuther 1976; Kahneman and Tversky 1979). The job losses of
the past ten years have weighed heavily on the nation’s middle-classes
because they involve educated professionals and managers — people like
us, people with whom we can identify. The downsizings and plant closures
of the early 1980s did not generate nearly the same amount of angst or
media coverage even though the displacement rate then was higher than in
the 1990s.
Recent job cuts also rankled the middle-class because they were widely
perceived as unfair: the violation of an implicit contract to provide security
until senior management’s own jobs were in peril, that is, until the company
was close to closure. One former IBM employee said, “In January I was told
my job was the safest in the nation. In February we were told half the jobs
would be gone” (Sampson 1995: 225). Fueling the sense of unfairness was
the belief that layoffs resulted not from a search for efWciency but from
a greed-driven change in corporate governance that favored owners over
employees. Repeatedly in the late 1980s and early 1990s, there were reports
of proWtable companies laying workers off and then enjoying stock-price
increases that beneWted senior management and other major shareholders,
as at General Dynamics or in the more egregious case of Al Dunlap, former
CEO of Sunbeam ( Jacoby 1998).11
Fallacy of Discontinuity
Another reason for the discrepancy between the rhetoric and reality of
change in employment relations is what might be called, following historian
David Hackett Fischer, the fallacy of discontinuity — an erroneous belief
that the present is fundamentally different from the periods that preceded
it. Not only fashion designers but journalists, management consultants, and
academics build their careers around this conceit. Consultants are particu-
larly prone to a faddish way of thinking, since it helps to generate sales
of new systems premised on the assumption that the world has changed so
drastically as to render worthless existing ways of doing business. Academics
have similar proclivities. Enthusiasts for change dramatically pronounce
“the demise of organizational careers” and their replacement by something
radically different: the “boundaryless career” (Fisher 1970; Hilmer and
Donaldson 1996; Arthur and Rousseau 1996). 
The media, in particular, seized upon the layoffs of the early 1990s as evi-
dence that the American workplace had become, as the New York Times put
it, “new and unnerving.” The Times 1996 multipart series and subsequent
book on the “Downsizing of America” took two dozen people more than
seven months to produce. It was the longest piece of journalism published
by the Times since the Pentagon Papers in 1971 (Cassidy 1996).Yet while the
series was chock full of painful personal stories, it was virtually devoid of eco-
nomic statistics for gauging the severity, extent, and consequences of layoff.
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Then there is the Challenger, Gray data series, compiled by a Chicago-
based company that specializes in outplacement services. They tabulate
corporate announcements of intended, not actual, layoffs. Since the series
began in the early 1990s, the media has regularly reported Challenger’s
monthly Wgures. But the number of workers actually laid off is often much
lower than the job-elimination plans reported in the news releases. Com-
panies announce the highest cutback totals they can justify to impress
investors that they are getting lean and mean, and then pursue cuts through
mechanisms other than layoff. Sudden mass departures do occur, but reduc-
tions also are handled through normal turnover, through transfers, through
early retirements, or simply by leaving vacancies unWlled. That is, because
the layoffs take place by mechanisms other than layoff and the process’
occurs over a lengthy period, a portion of the announced layoff never actu-
ally occurs (Silverstein and Maharaj 1999).
Risk Shifting: Practices and Prospects
None of this is intended to deny the fact that there has been a rise in job
loss, especially for those employees thought to be most immune to it. While
the direct effect has been overstated, the indirect effect surely has been to
expose incumbent employees to a greater risk of job loss. Employers have
in other respects been shifting more of the risk burden onto employees.
That is the logic of managed care and of larger deductibles for health insur-
ance, both of which have grown steadily since 1991 (U.S. BLS various
years). It is also the rationale behind the change from deWned beneWt pen-
sion plans to deWned contribution plans. Employers also are incorporat-
ing more variability into employee pay packages via discretionary bonuses,
group incentives, proWt sharing, and stock options. In economists’ parlance,
more pay is “at risk.”12 
The reallocation of risk — not the decline of career-type jobs — is the
central dynamic driving today’s internal labor markets. Employers are still
protecting employees from the hazards of unemployment, sickness, and
old-age. However, companies today operate in a turbulent environment of
heightened competition, mergers, and rapid technological change. It is a
riskier world, and employers are less willing to shoulder as much risk for
employees as they did in the past.13
Some employees are adapting to this risk — especially younger, more
educated workers with “hot” skills — while others are having a tough time
of it. These workers still look to their employers as the Wrst line of defense.
As that line is pushed back, they question the fairness of today’s risk-
sharing arrangements. While most of these workers are not about to lose
their jobs, they are left feeling more insecure. Forty-Wve percent of employ-
ees in 1977 thought it was not at all likely they would lose their jobs, but the
Wgure has fallen to 30 percent today. Every layoff announcement affects the
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perceived probability of job loss and causes survivors to work harder and
worry more. Thus layoffs can have ripple effects far beyond their direct
labor cost saving.14
Does this mean, then, that eventually we can expect to see the risk bur-
den completely shifted to employees, such that employers no longer will
offer fringe beneWts, career jobs, Wxed salaries, and so on? The short answer
is no. Assuming that current trends will continue without limit is a reductio
ad absurdum, just as it would have been equally absurd to predict in the
1880s that all jobs would become career positions carrying generous fringe
beneWts. There are economic, demographic, and political limits to the risk
reallocation process. These limits ensure that the corporation likely will
remain a central risk-bearing institution in American society.
One such limit has to do with the organizational realities of managing a
workforce. For most employers, the net economic beneWts of welfare capi-
talism remain positive. Employee loyalty and commitment still matter, espe-
cially in the burgeoning service sector where it is often difWcult to directly
supervise employees (Herzenberg et al. 1998). New workers have to be
trained, which makes employee turnover costly. Employee skills are, if any-
thing, more important today than in the past, especially in fast-changing
situations where little is codiWed and knowledge is tacit. New systems of
work organization — such as self-managed teams — are less prevalent than
is commonly supposed but nevertheless have grown markedly in recent
years. These systems are accompanied by higher levels of training and tend
to be associated with career-type jobs, since job stability preserves the inter-
personal relationships that make teams effective. Hence, to the extent these
systems continue to proliferate, they create employer incentives to stabilize
employment.15
For these reasons, companies like 3M, Intel, and Motorola have —
despite layoffs — preserved career-type jobs, albeit lacking guarantees of
permanence. There is plenty of evidence that the practices associated with
career-job policies — such as training, proWt sharing, and participatory
work systems — are positively related to corporate performance. Other
companies that have downsized in recent years are discovering that out-
sourcing and temporary employees — while cheaper in the short run — do
not provide the levels of service and quality that are necessary for customer
satisfaction (Levine 1995; U.S. DOL 1993; Rebitzer 1995; Pfeffer 1998).16
A recent study of companies that have implemented “employability” con-
tracts — offering learning experiences in return for heightened employee
responsibilities — concludes that the most successful employers are those
who retain “a sense of responsibility to protect the jobs of their people”
(Bartlett and Ghoshal 1997).
Some argue that companies in dynamic sectors like Silicon Valley, Holly-
wood, and Wall Street operate according to a different, more market-
oriented, logic. Here, workers tend to be relatively young and educated, and
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they can move easily from job to job. Employers do not penalize such mobil-
ity because it helps them to keep abreast of competitors and stay on the
cutting edge. In Silicon Valley, for example, there is pervasive interWrm
mobility. Workers are well paid and can afford their own health beneWts and
401(k) plans. However, these workers are an atypical elite, just as footloose
craft workers were an atypical but essential elite in American industry
ninety years ago. Most workers do not have skills that are either as scarce
or as critical to business performance as the technologists in the Valley
( Jones 1996).
Also, the employers of this elite are dissimilar in important respects from
the bulk of the companies that constitute our economy. Today, most U.S.
companies are service providers whose success depends less on technologi-
cal breakthroughs than on customer attraction and retention. One key to
customer loyalty is employee loyalty: experienced and satisWed employees
are much better at Wnding and keeping customers than fresh recruits. In
industries such as Wnancial services, the fastest-growing occupations are
those that require interpersonal skills, which, unlike accounting positions,
are difWcult to replace with computerized information systems. These inter-
personal skills are relatively less important in high-technology industries
that are mistakenly touted as exemplars of the future (Frei et al. 1995).17
Even high-technology companies are beginning to recognize that rapid
turnover and short employment stints can be detrimental. Take, for exam-
ple, SAS, a software company based in North Carolina. The company
sounds like a throwback to the heyday of welfare capitalism. It offers a
thirty-Wve-hour work week, on-site child care, a lavish exercise facility, and
subsidized cafes with live piano music. To make sure employees are healthy,
the company maintains its own medical facility with Wve nurse practition-
ers, two family practice doctors, a massage therapist, and a mental health
nurse. To retain potentially mobile knowledge workers, it tries to accom-
modate people’s changing careers within the company, not by losing them
to competitors. (Turnover at SAS is only one-tenth the Silicon Valley norm.)
The company’s HR manager said, “At 5 P.M., 95 percent of our assets walk
out the door. We have to have an environment that makes them want to walk
back in the door the next morning.” Past history suggests that as some com-
panies accelerate the internalization process, others will follow suit as a
defensive necessity (Groves 1999: 55–56).
Second, there are demographic limits to restructuring. Many workers
laid off during the past decade came from the relatively small pre-1945 gen-
eration that preceded the baby boomers. At one bank, for example, the
director said “the machine guns started Wring on day one [after a recent
merger], with anyone over 50 in the front rank.” Because older workers
are paid more, they are targeted for layoff and are likely to experience sub-
sequent earnings declines; younger displaced workers recently have been
experiencing gains in their median weekly earnings (Economist 1998; U.S.
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BLS 1998a). Employer animus toward older workers reveals an important
fact: despite all the talk about delayering, corporations remain pyramidal
organizations in which seniority and pay are positively related; hence you
can cut labor costs by targeting senior workers for layoff.18 It was feasible to
conduct layoffs in the late 1980s and early 1990s because replacement work-
ers from the baby boom generation were plentiful. However, the cohort
behind the boomers — generation X — is relatively small. Current esti-
mates are that the number of 35- to 44-year-olds will decline by 15 percent
between 2000 and 2015 (Chambers et al. 1998). There is little in sight to
relieve the demographic pressure on employers. The long-term rise in
female labor force participation is leveling off, while white-collar produc-
tivity gains are Wat. In short, current employer concerns with labor scarcity
and retention are likely to persist into the next century, putting a brake on
future risk shifting.
Finally, there are political limits to the amount of risk shifting that
American employers can or would want to pursue. Currently, the United
States has lower unionization rates than any other advanced industrial
country. Our government spends less on social insurance per worker than
other advanced industrial countries. Corporate managers know — or may
discover — that if they let welfare capitalism wither, there will be popular
pressure for government and perhaps even for unions to Wll the gap. That
is precisely why Buchanan’s candidacy caused such a stir in 1996.
The only aspect of risk shifting that knows no limits is a belief in its
inevitability, a habit of mind that Albert O. Hirschman (1991) associates
with the “rhetoric of futility.” The futility argument proceeds by identifying
deep forces — economic logic or human nature — that cannot be altered.
Attempts to change them are hopeless and will perversely result in the
reassertion of those forces. In economics, the doctrine of rational expec-
tations — that activist Wscal policy is useless in permanently lowering the
unemployment rate — is one such example. A similar rhetoric infuses
assertions that market individualism has triumphed in the economy. Even
when shown to be empirically implausible, those claims nevertheless have
real consequences. They encourage the belief that alternative institutions
are destined for extinction. Hence to retain those institutions — whether
welfare capitalism or the welfare state — is an exercise in futility. Better to
hasten the future by dismantling bureaucracies, dissociating from organiza-
tions, and taking care of “numero uno” — after all, no one else can or will.
However, as Hirschman goes on to point out, the rhetoric of futility is
often proclaimed prematurely; it is a form of wishful thinking. Similarly, it
is wishful thinking to believe that market individualism is rampant and that
we are living in a world of tenuous associations and arm’s-length relation-
ships, the system idealized by nineteenth-century contract law (Horowitz
1979). In fact, we still inhabit a society where markets — including labor
markets — coexist and coevolve with regulations, social norms, and other
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institutions. Economic historian Karl Polanyi was the Wrst to identify this
“double movement” of two great organizing principles: the expansion of
the market and the simultaneous expansion of market regulation. If one
studies closely the economic deregulation that has occurred in various sec-
tors over the last twenty years, what one Wnds is not a move to pure laissez-
faire but instead a redeWnition of government responsibilities, a process
that one political scientist calls “reregulation.” As for social regulation,
keep in mind that the Reagan administration had little luck in rolling back
either Social Security or environmental and consumer protection. Mean-
while, the volume of such regulation has steadily grown in the 1990s, in the
labor market and elsewhere (Vogel 1996). This suggests a simple conclusion:
while we cannot change the level of risk in today’s economy, we can change
the rules that govern how risk is shared among the participants to the eco-
nomic game.
For example, the SEC could require companies to include statements
on their balance sheets of how much they have invested in their employees.
That would be a Wrst step to getting managers and investors to accurately
recognize the value of a Wrm’s human capital. Second, we can reform our
labor laws. Employer unfair labor practices have skyrocketed in recent
years, and the law is failing to protect legitimate union organizing attempts.
Third, we can change the incentives faced by investors. Today, institutional
investors own two-thirds of the total equity in the stock market. Institutional
investors are Wckle creatures who move their capital with breath-taking
rapidity. Pension funds should pay capital gains taxes on the stock they
churn around. Also, mutual funds could do more to penalize short-term
traders for the costs that they incur, such as raising transactions fees and
contributing them to the purchased company or mutual fund to beneWt
long-term returns (Weiler 1990).
Conclusions
The labor market is in Xux, but it would be a mistake to project the future
out of recent trends. Career jobs are less expansive, but they have not melted
into air. While people are unhappy with the risk they are being asked to
shoulder, they still look to employers to share much of the burden. Accord-
ing to pollsters, today’s middle-class Americans think that corporations
“should balance their self-interest with the need to consider what bene-
Wts the larger society” (Wolfe 1998). Those who ask that corporations be
responsible are not asking for anything outside the welfare capitalist frame-
work established by corporations themselves. There remains widespread
support for the notion that corporations are — or should be — the key-
stone of economic security in American society. That is the path we have
been on for the last one hundred years, and we remain on that trajectory.
The risk shifting experienced by workers in the economy’s core is a serious
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problem. However, we must not let it overshadow the more critical situation
facing less-educated and less-skilled workers. Those workers are steadily
falling behind as a result of technological change and globalization as
well as factors speciWc to the United States such as high immigration, weak
minimum wage laws, and the decline of unionism. Since 1980, earnings in-
equality has grown more rapidly in the United States than other advanced
countries. Low-wage U.S. workers are both relatively and absolutely poorer
than their European or Japanese counterparts (Mishel et al. 1999).
The problem of inequality should not be confused with the rising risk of
job loss. True, when less-educated workers lose their jobs, they are more
likely than educated workers to experience a permanent reduction in earn-
ings. However, a similar earnings disparity also exists for those who never
lose their jobs. When we examine the stock of continuing jobs, we Wnd
that long-term employment relationships (over twenty years) currently are
as prevalent for those with twelve or fewer years of education as they are
for those with baccalaureate and advanced degrees (Fallick 1996; Howell
1997).19 In short, the primary cause of inequality is not downsizing but ris-
ing returns to education accompanied by the waning of wage-setting insti-
tutions in the low-wage labor market (e.g., the shrinkage of unions and of
real minimum wages). Middle-class workers are entitled to a better deal, but
their predicament — and our own anxieties — should not overshadow the
plight of low-wage workers.
Notes
An earlier version of this chapter appeared in California Management Review 42, 1
(Fall 1999), copyright © 1999 Regents of the University of California. Reprinted by
permission.
1. In manufacturing, job-loss rates in the mid-1990s were half the level observed
in the early 1980s (Farber 1997; C. Kletzer 1998: 119).
2. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1998b). If the analysis is limited to large Wrms,
the evidence of job stability is even more striking. For 51 large companies that were
clients of Watson Wyatt, a consulting Wrm, average tenure increased in the 1990s, as
did the percentage of employees with ten years (and twenty years) of service or
more. Even in Wrms with shrinking employment, the odds that a worker would be
with the employer Wve years later were higher than the same odds for the labor mar-
ket as a whole. (Allen, Clark, and Schieber 1999).
3. Bansak and Raphael (1998). Note, however, that when one focuses on tenure
rather than separations, older workers do not show larger tenure declines than
younger workers. One explanation could be that older workers who have suffered
permanent layoff are more inclined to leave the labor market. See Neumark, Polsky,
and Hansen (1998).
4. U.S. Bureau of the Census (1998) <www.census.gov/population/socdemo/
migration>.
5. These data are drawn from Compustat listings for U.S.-based companies for
the period 1990–97. Companies whose employment was affected by merger or liq-
uidation were not included in the sample. MCI and Worldcom merged late in 1998.
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6. Johnson (1998); Vance and Roy Scott (1997); Roush (1999). One reason com-
panies no longer tout explicit no-layoff policies is the spate of dismissal suits in
recent years. Plaintiffs sometimes won by claiming breach of an implied promise to
provide continuous employment, such as were found in employee handbooks and
other personnel policies. (Perritt 1998).
7. The idea of a market-organization continuum is nicely developed in Dore
(1989).
8. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1998a); Koretz (1998); Fallick (1996); Jacob-
son et al. (1993). Over the past two years, the share of workers worried about losing
their jobs fell from 44 percent to 37 percent (Manski and Straub 1999).
9. Another reason for the decline in the take-up rate (the rate at which employ-
ees take beneWts offered to them) is the recent rapid growth in tailored beneWt plans
permitting employees to pick and choose beneWts. In 1988, 13 percent of big com-
panies gave employees this option; now over half do (Economist 1996: 91–92).
10. Bloom and Freeman (1992); Woods (1994); Even and Macpherson (1994);
Employee BeneWt Plan Review (1994); U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1999). If
employers, in fact, move radically away from provision of retirement beneWts,
employees would likely respond by saving at higher rates. But despite the recrude-
scene of market individualism, the U.S. private savings rate has steadily trended
down since the early 1980s.
11. Note, however, that the evidence does not support the popular belief that
downsizing boosts stock prices and CEO pay. After controlling for factors like Wrm
size, the effect of layoffs on CEO pay is nil and there is a small negative share price
reaction to layoff announcements (Hallock 1998).
12. In medium to large establishments, the proportion of employees with deWned
beneWt plans fell from 59 to 50 percent between 1991 and 1997; the proportion with
deWned contribution plans rose from 48 to 57 percent. Note, however, that some
employees are covered by both types of plans and that some of the shifting occurred
across rather than within Wrms due to rapid job growth in smaller, nonunion com-
panies that are less likely to offer deWned beneWt plans (U.S. Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics various years; also see Ippolito 1995; and Benoit 1996).
13. The head of human resources at IBM, Gerald Czarnecki, characterizes his
company’s new approach as a “readjustment which needs a new balancing act. . . . I
never thought it was good for a corporation to take over the role of the family unit,
which is more dependable for society. Now the pendulum will swing back, to give a
larger role to the family. But there’s still a role for all three — family, business, and
government” (Sampson 1995: 229).
14. Bond, Galinsky, and Swanberg (1998); Ambrose (1996). EfWciency wage mod-
els relate the probability of job loss to employee effort levels. These models are a
microeconomic version of the Kalecki effect (Valletta 1997; Aaronson and Sullivan
1998).
15. Finding and training a replacement typically costs about 55 percent of a
departing employee’s annual salary (Economist 1998). For establishments with over
Wfty employees, 30 percent use self-directed work teams, with a coverage rate (per-
centage of employees affected) of around 12 percent (Erickson and Jacoby 1998;
Gittleman et al. 1998).
16. For some contrary evidence on the probability of a low-road approach, see
Bailey and Bernhardt (1997).
17. For a similar argument by the head of Bain & Company, see Reichheld
(1996). Although he does not remark on it, Reichheld’s case studies come from ser-
vice industries that are the employment-growth sectors of the U.S. economy: Wnan-
cial services, retail sales, insurance, and eating establishments.
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18. A study of managerial downsizing in British companies reaches similar con-
clusions. It Wnds “no evidence of the kind of transformational change associated
with the introduction of a new model. Instead, we Wnd that the traditional model of
managerial employment has been eroded rather than replaced” (McGovern et al.
1998: 457).
19. Cutting the tenure data at over ten, rather than over twenty years, does give
college graduates an edge over high-school dropouts in the percentage holding long-
term jobs. But this advantage also existed twenty years ago, before wage inequality
had grown wide (Farber 1997b; Diebold et al. 1997).
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Chapter 9
Career Jobs Are Dead
Peter Cappelli
Most observers have a strong sense that jobs and especially careers are dif-
ferent now as compared to previous decades, but it is often hard to put that
difference into words. The traditional categories that we use to describe
jobs — long term versus short term, high wages and beneWts versus low
beneWts, managerial versus production work — come from an earlier era
and reXect the long-standing concern about whether jobs, blue-collar jobs
in particular, provide the means to prevent hardship for employees and
their families. Sanford Jacoby’s article, “Are Career Jobs Headed for Extinc-
tion?” (this volume) examines how employment has changed based largely
on the traditional criteria noted above. “Career jobs” are implicitly deWned
in his chapter as full-time jobs that last reasonably long, pay reasonably
well, and offer beneWts, reXecting the public policy concern about whether
jobs provide the means to prevent economic hardship. (I Wnd it more accu-
rate to refer to such jobs as “good jobs” and do so below.) He Wnds change
in some dimensions but evidence of stability in most others. He will get
little argument that inequality in outcomes has increased sharply.1 The fact
that the working poor have not participated to the same extent as other seg-
ments of the workforce in the economic expansion is perhaps the most
important point about rising inequality. His overall conclusion that while
all is not well in the labor market, there are still lots of these good jobs (that
provide good wages and beneWts and that last a reasonable period of time)
seems like a fair one.2 However, the fact that there could be a serious debate
as to whether jobs have gotten worse during one of the greatest periods of
economic expansion in the history of the United States is itself interesting
evidence of a change in the economy.
These traditional criteria are not the only aspects of employment, of
course, and perhaps not what most readers would think of as central to the
issue of careers. Particularly those who are interested in managerial work
think of career jobs as ones where employees can expect a career, that is, a
succession of advancing jobs within the same organization and employment
practices that are under the employer’s control.
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Something is fundamentally different about contemporary employment
as compared to earlier periods, but it is not necessarily a story about wors-
ening terms and conditions of employment. Instead, it is a story about
the rising importance of labor markets in shaping jobs and careers and
the associated decline in the ability of employers to manage employment
and careers inside their organizations. An important cause of the change
has been the fact that Wrms have brought markets inside their own walls
through outsourcing, bench-marking, and decentralized responsibility for
performance. Once these market forces came inside Wrms, they began to
inXuence employment as well. Other factors include the restructuring both
of the external boundaries of the Wrm and its internal systems in ways that
disrupt career prospects and create permanent insecurity about one’s job.
Still other changes relate to volatility in product markets and the faster
adjustments to them that cause systems and skills to become obsolete more
quickly and the demand for new skills to rise more quickly than internal
development would allow. Outside hiring results, and it may be the most
important factor driving the new market-based employment relationships.
In these new relationships, we still have full-time jobs, including a grow-
ing number of managerial jobs that pay reasonably well and that offer good
beneWts. What we do not have is long-term security — if for no other rea-
son than because the employer’s current structure is not very secure — or
predictable prospects for internal advancement. Also, the management of
employees, including practices such as compensation and development, are
driven by the outside market rather than by internal administrative princi-
ples. These developments raise important challenges for employees, espe-
cially those interested in advancing their careers, as they must increasingly
look across companies, as opposed to within them, for opportunities. At
least from the perspective of management advice, this is relatively old news.3
The challenges for employers, on the other hand, are less well known and
perhaps even more important. They center on the basic challenge of man-
aging employees as a market-based resource, one that can more easily walk
away with the employer’s investments.
Because I agree with Jacoby’s main conclusion about the persistence of
good jobs, it might be helpful to highlight the points of apparent difference
in our argument:
• The good old days were not so good. Employer interest in protecting
employees from insecurity never ran very deep and was probably always
motivated by self-interest. The downside of these internal labor markets
was often a kind of industrial feudalism, to use Clark Kerr’s phrase,
where employees were trapped in a company because there was no out-
side hiring.
• Declining protections for employees may have less to do with any change
in values about the responsibility to employees and more to do with the
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fact that the new environment for business makes stability incredibly
difWcult to achieve and long-term, predictable careers nearly impossible.
• Despite the general persistence of good jobs, additional evidence suggests
that jobs are getting less secure and less stable. This is particularly so for
white-collar and managerial jobs, the ones that truly were protected
under the old model. The assumption that white-collar employees had
special protections from insecurity no longer seems valid.
• Most important, “career jobs” as deWned by long-term, advancement pros-
pects in the same organization with employment practices that served
internal concerns, are in decline, and their future prospects are poor.
Again, this is especially so for white-collar jobs.
How Responsible Were Employers for Their Employees?
The obligations between employers and employees is an interesting issue
that easily takes one deeply into the Welds of business ethics, contract law,
and psychology in addition to human resources. A more tractable ques-
tion is, to what extent were expectations of secure jobs and some protec-
tions from the market the result of a deep employer commitment, perhaps
rooted in some deeper value system like a social contract, or was it mainly
the result of a stable economic system that made stable employment rea-
sonably costless?
One place to start this discussion is to recall that as late as the second
decade of this century, employment relationships were more like a free mar-
ket than perhaps even today. The “inside contractor” model was the domi-
nant system for manufacturing, essentially a model of virtual organizations
where owners outsourced even production operations to contractors oper-
ating in the owner’s facility. Professional agents handled the marketing,
sales, and distribution of companies on a fee or contingent contract basis.
Employees in some industries, such as tapestries, moved routinely from
company to company, facilitating knowledge transfer in the process. The
turnover of key talent was managed carefully, but turnover of other employ-
ees was often remarkably high (Cappelli forthcoming).
Jacoby and others have written in great detail about the history of em-
ployer interest in protecting employees, and I will only paraphrase it here
( Jacoby 1997; Brandes 1976; Nelson 1995). While the intellectual roots
of this interest go back to the 1800s, the Wrst arrangements that were both
reasonably widespread and that had any claim to be concerned explicitly
with employee welfare was the system of welfare capitalism beginning in the
1920s. My reading of the literature on welfare capitalism suggests quite
clearly that the motivation for protecting employees was always the self-
interest of company performance. Assembly-line production systems that
beneWted from reduced turnover had already driven efforts to stabilize
employment, such as Henry Ford’s famous Wve-dollar-a-day program. Union
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avoidance was far and away the most important objective. The companies
most dedicated to stabilizing employment and job security were those whose
stable product markets made this outcome relatively easy to achieve. Nor
is it clear how widespread these arrangements were. Welfare capitalism was
primarily a movement of the largest companies, and it was not clear that
even a majority of these employers were ever governed by its principles.
Most observers see welfare capitalism fading from the scene, either com-
pletely or in large measure by the Great Depression, and eventually being
replaced by management’s pragmatic acceptance of collective bargaining
as the primary mechanism for protecting employee welfare. The main
arrangements for protecting employees from economic insecurity, such as
seniority-based layoffs and promotions, supplemental unemployment insur-
ance and severance pay, and low levels of contingent jobs, were collective
bargaining outcomes initiated by unions that nonunion Wrms adopted to
buy off employee interest in unionization.4 It is important to remember
that even in this golden age of employee protections, from World War II
through to the 1981 recession, workers were constantly being laid off with
the business cycle. They had stable jobs in the sense that they would return
to the same employer, but layoffs were typical. Employer support for collec-
tive bargaining never meant any widespread acceptance of unions. By the
1970s, for example, sophisticated union avoidance campaigns were com-
mon, and many employers — perhaps a majority — were taking actions to
undermine the unions, some of which included violations of labor law.5
The story for white-collar workers was always different. There the model
for managing employees was not welfare capitalism, which was directed at
production workers, but managerial capitalism, where the managers of the
company acted to pursue their own goals as distinct from those of the own-
ers. White-collar and managerial employees were the organization, at least
in the eyes of the executives.6 What most people think of as career jobs —
good prospects for steady, predictable advancement, lifetime security sub-
ject to minimum performance levels, as well good wages and beneWts — was
more or less in place with the formation of large, multidivisional corpora-
tions, expanding in scope and scale as the management structures expanded.
In this model, employees were hired based on general skills and attributes,
received elaborate initial training, and had a career that was internal to
the Wrm. The systems for managing employees, such as wage and beneWt
policies, training and development systems, promotion ladders, and other
practices of internal labor markets, were part of the elaborate internal
administration of the Wrm.
What is easy to forget now is the rather obvious dark side of these
arrangements, especially for managers. Internal labor markets with outside
hiring only at the entry level and all promotions internal to the company
meant that employees were stuck with their current employer. If they did
not Wt, they had no choice but to suffer or adapt, and Wtting in had as much
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to do with altering one’s politics, social attitudes, and values as it did with
performance. William H. Whyte’s (1956) classic The Organization Man is
perhaps the best known critique of this system, but other observers such
as C. Wright Mills (1953) and (two decades later) Rosabeth Moss Kanter
(1977) helped document the often coercive effects it had on employees.
What can we conclude about employers’ acceptance of and commitment
to the principle that employees should be protected from market risk? Blue-
collar workers were protected from short-term, cyclical economic insecurity
by union contracts or, in nonunion Wrms, by policies designed to mimic
the provisions of those contracts. Although management agreed to those
arrangements, they typically did so as a result of union bargaining power. It
is difWcult to see these provisions as a manifestation of employer concern
about the need to protect employees. Active efforts to erode union gains
were underway even before the restructuring waves of the 1980s. White-
collar and especially managerial employees, in contrast, experienced a
greater commitment. They were given to expect not just protection from
insecurity, but lifetime careers inside the company. Elaborate employment
systems served that goal with arrangements that were internally focused.
It is hard to gauge the depth of the employer’s commitment to protecting
white-collar and managerial employees in this period or, put more bluntly,
what Wrms were willing to pay to provide protection. Both the operating
environment and the nature of companies were different in that period
in ways that made it substantially easier to provide stable employment and
career paths. Especially for large companies, product markets were stable
and much more predictable in many industries explicitly regulated by the
government to ensure stability. Foreign competition was very limited, and
domestic competition often operated as an oligopoly where unions effec-
tively took labor costs out of competition with standardized union contracts.
Large companies such as IBM made 10- and 15-year business plans that
proved accurate. In the context of such plans, it was sensible and realistic
to lay out equivalent human resource plans and to say to individual employ-
ees: “This is our career plan for you until you retire. And here is how we are
going to manage you to ensure that it happens.”
The economic instability that these large companies experienced was
mainly the temporary kind associated with business cycles. They did bear
the cost of protecting at least white-collar and managerial employees from
recessions and from modest restructuring efforts. IBM in particular argued,
with some justiWcation, that the employment security they offered employ-
ees facilitated what by contemporary standards was low-level restructuring
of operations brought on by unforeseen market changes.7 However, there
was relatively little pressure to maximize shareholder value, at least by
contemporary standards, and executives had much greater discretion to
devote resources to such goals. The big restructuring challenges were yet
to come.
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No doubt there were individual employers who shouldered big burdens
to protect employees; and no doubt employers talked about their practices
in terms of the social good. However, in my view, the commitments that
most employers had to protect their employees were not very broad, did not
run very deep, and had at least as much to do with self-interest as with any
broader concern about employee welfare. The best way to test this propo-
sition is to see what happened to that commitment when employers faced
much more serious pressures for change in the next period, when the cost
of providing protections rose sharply. In that situation, most all of them
abandoned virtually everything about the old system, even the rhetoric
about their responsibility to employees.
What Went Wrong?
The world began to change for employers with the 1981–82 recession, the
worst economic period since the Great Depression, which brought with it
structural changes that went well beyond the usual cyclical downturn in
product demand. A number of important changes in the economy and in
the way business was conducted got underway in that period. They include
the following:
Pressures to increase shareholder value — The rising inXuence of institu-
tional investors and legal decisions that made maximizing shareholder
value not only the singular goal for directors of public companies and the
executives they managed, but made shareholders the only stakeholders to
whom companies were legally accountable. New Wnancial institutions such
as junk bonds made possible hostile takeovers of companies that were not
maximizing shareholder value. Any resources that companies may have
devoted to other causes, such as protecting employees from business risks,
were quickly transferred to the goal of shareholder value.8 More important,
investors and analysts seemed to be persuaded that cutting jobs raises
shareholder value even though the hard evidence on that point is decidedly
mixed. New accounting techniques (such as economic value added that
sought to maximize shareholder value) punished Wxed costs, including the
Wxed investments in employees.9
Changes in the boundaries of the Wrm — Companies were persuaded that
divesting unrelated businesses and acquiring new ones with appropriate
synergies could raise shareholder value, and mergers and acquisitions rose
to record levels year after year. Companies concerned about focusing on
their core competencies learned to outsource functions that were not cen-
tral to their capabilities and to pursue joint ventures as an alternative to
internal development of capabilities. The consequence for employment
was to disrupt long-term career paths and, more fundamentally, to make
the security of all functions and jobs uncertain. Any operation could be
divested if changing markets and changing patterns of competition aligned
208 Peter Cappelli
10chap9.qxd  1/8/03  10:43 AM  Page 208
themselves, and all functions could be outsourced if a low-cost vendor came
along. One might say that the number of good jobs stays the same in this
model and the jobs just move around from company to company, but such
movement and the constant uncertainty about movement undermined job
security and any attempt to develop long-term careers.
Changes in the nature of competition — Shorter production cycles and more
rapid change in business strategies associated with faster-paced compe-
tition made skills obsolete more quickly. Examples are the change from
physical chemistry to biotechnology in pharmaceuticals or from one mar-
ket segment in insurance to another, where the skills needed are completely
different. Employers simply did not have time to develop the new skills they
needed internally when dramatic changes in products and strategies hap-
pened quickly. So they turned to outside hiring to get those new skills. They
also turned to outside hiring to get the managerial skills and experience
to facilitate changes in their administrative operations. One way to think
about these developments is that product life cycles have now become
shorter than the expected career of an employee (see below).
Changes in the management of organizations — Work systems that empower
employees, such as cross-functional teams, broke down traditional job lad-
ders, eliminated supervisory positions, and widened spans of control. Infor-
mation systems eliminated many of the internal control functions of middle
management positions, and decentralizing operations through the creation
of proWt centers and similar arrangements further reduced the need for
central administration. Flatter hierarchies and the sharp reduction in cen-
tral administration reduced promotion prospects.
Policy decisions — Public policy in the 1980s contributed to the pressures
to unbundle employee protection provisions inside Wrms. The Reagan ad-
ministration explicitly argued for increasing employer discretion in employ-
ment decisions in an attempt to link economic competitiveness to the
ability to shed redundant employees, a position that arguably had more
inXuence on management than the decision to Wre the striking PATCO
workers. Various reports gave guidance as to the best ways to cut work-
forces. Even under a Democratic administration, the U.S. Department of
Labor had by 1995 accepted that companies would continue to restructure
their operations in ways that cut jobs. It argued not for preventing such
changes but for minimizing the damage to employees (USDOL 1995).
Coercive pressures from leaders in the employer community also reversed.
IBM’s announcement of its decision to abandon employment security and
lay off employees was followed shortly thereafter by a wave of layoffs among
other large employers. The business community organized itself to press
for greater Xexibility in employment. For example, the Labor Policy Asso-
ciation, an employer group concerned with public policy, produced a
widely circulated study arguing that the key to improved corporate perfor-
mance is greater management discretion in employment decisions — in
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other words, the end of administrative practices to protect jobs. The re-
quirements of employment legislation also created incentives to unravel
the internalized employment structure, incentives that built as regulations
increased. The vast array of federal legislation directed at employment has
largely been tied to the traditional, internalized model of employment.
Alternative arrangements, such as contracting out or contingent work, can
mean that “employers” are no longer covered by the legislation, freeing
them from its obligations.
Market alternatives — An enormous market has developed to respond to
these developments. Vendors now exist who will take in every function that
could be outsourced. StafWng agencies will lease employees with any set of
skills, even CEOs, so that labor costs can be transformed from Wxed to vari-
able costs. As noted below, corporate recruiters now offer a rich menu of
available applicants to any employer willing to pursue outside hiring.
The protections against temporary, business-cycle layoffs for blue-collar
workers proved largely useless against plant closings and other sources of
displacement brought on by these changes. To illustrate, seniority-based lay-
offs in the old model effectively redistributed the risk of the typical lay-
off threat, which was recession-related, to junior employees so that senior
employees were essentially immune to them. However, seniority-based lay-
offs, which are a within-plant practice, provide no protection against plant
closings, now a much more real threat. Even if actual layoffs are no greater
than in the past, all workers now experience insecurity associated with
them. In an effort to reduce Wxed costs, employers also shift more of their
tasks to vendors and contingent workers. These changes may not reduce the
number of “good jobs” in the economy, but they make current jobs less
stable and less secure, reducing the prospects of long-term careers in the
same organization. Further, the terms and conditions of employment in
these facilities are now governed less by internal considerations, such as
equity, and much more by conditions in the outside market.
However, white-collar and managerial employees experienced the most
fundamental changes because they were the ones with the most protections
to lose. First, they now faced much the same increased insecurity and in-
stability as production workers, a profound change as it undermined what
had been the very basis of the distinction between white collar and blue
collar. That distinction stems from the New Deal era Fair Labor Standards
Act, which is based on the assumption that production workers needed
legislative protections that white-collar workers did not because the latter
were already protected by the Wrm. Second, white-collar employees also saw
internal careers evaporating as job ladders shrank, restructuring disrupted
the promotion tracks that remained, and external hiring blocked advance-
ment by Wlling more senior positions. To argue that there has been no
signiWcant change in employment relationships requires asserting that the
above changes in the employer’s world are either not very signiWcant or
that, somehow they never got down to the employees.
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Evidence of a Changing Relationship
Most of the research associated with changes in the labor market addresses
the traditional public policy concern about current terms and conditions of
employment. Labor market data in particular are not designed to address
questions such as future prospects for job security or for careers inside
Wrms as these are primarily issues about organizational practices. The U.S.
government, for example, did not survey for permanent (as distinct from
recession-based and temporary) job losses until after 1984. However, some
labor market evidence is available that relates to whether career jobs — and
not just good jobs — have declined. The main overlap between the concept
of good jobs and career jobs as deWned above is the issue of job stability
and, to a lesser extent, job security. Some care is necessary in interpreting
such evidence, however. One reason is that while studies typically look for
changes in outcomes for the workforce as a whole, some large percentage of
the workforce never had anything like the traditional relationships.10 So a
Wnding that there is only a modest decline in some outcome for the work-
force as a whole might mask a considerable breakdown in relationships for
that segment of the economy that truly had career jobs, such as managers.
This may help explain why observers who focus on labor market data are
the least likely to believe that there are important changes in employment,
while those who study organizations, especially managers, are perhaps the
most likely.11 The place to begin a review of the evidence is to acknowledge
two fundamental trends that Jacoby reviews in his chapter. The Wrst is the
sharp rise in unemployment for white-collar employees, especially relative
to other groups,12 which is certainly among the strongest evidence that
whatever special protection this employee group had in the past is gone.
The second and more general trend is the systematic shifting of business
risk onto employees that accompanied the restructuring of companies, a
point that my colleagues and I have documented at length.13 This is also evi-
dence that buffers against the market have broken down. The review below
begins with the evidence that was presented as equivocal in Jacoby’s survey
as it relates to career jobs and offers different conclusions about it.
Employee Tenure
Much of the argument suggesting that not much is new in employee rela-
tionships turns on research about job tenure — how long an employee stays
with their employer. Because so much is based on these Wndings, it is im-
portant to understand what they can and cannot tell us. First and perhaps
most important, it is a mistake to confuse stable jobs with secure jobs:
Sheherazade had a stable relationship with the Sultan if one looked at the
data on tenure because they were together for 1,001 Arabian nights. That
does not mean that it was a secure relationship given that he threatened to
have her terminated — literally — every night if her job performance fell.
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The distinction is perhaps easiest to see in Wrm-level studies such as Allen
and Clark’s interesting Wnding that tenure rose in large, stable Wrms during
the 1990s while 16 percent of the jobs in those Wrms were cut (Allen, Clark,
and Schieber forthcoming). 
Tenure is a confusing concept to interpret because it is driven by two quite
distinct components: voluntary quits and terminations. From the perspec-
tive of employees, only terminations drive job insecurity. We also know that
these two components move in opposite directions with the business cycle.
Quits fall and dismissals rise during downturns, vice versa during expan-
sions. Because the two components move in opposite directions, stability is
built into the overall tenure measure, which makes any changes in tenure
meaningful. The more important Wndings concern trends in quits and in
terminations examined separately. Here the results suggest, based on three
different sets of data, that permanent dismissals rose through the 1980s and
early 1990s while quit rates were falling. One study in particular Wnds that
the rate of dismissals increased sharply for older workers with more tenure,
doubling for workers ages 45 to 54.14
It is probably fair to say that the inconsistent results about changes in
overall tenure rates, sometimes even using the same data, does not make
one especially sanguine about the robustness of labor economics.15 It may
nevertheless be instructive to review the results. As noted above, it is impor-
tant to remember that not all workers had long-term, stable relationships
even in earlier periods. For example, now as in the past, roughly 40 percent
of the workforce has been with their current employer less than two years.
And, as noted above, average stability can mask considerable variance for
subgroups in the workforce. The above qualiWcations aside, while studies
found reasonable stability comparing the 1980s with earlier periods, more
recent results using data from the mid-1990s Wnd declines in average tenure,
especially for managerial employees but even for the workforce as a whole.
These include, in addition to the studies mentioned in Jacoby’s chapter,
studies that compare cohorts over time that seem to Wnd the biggest changes,
such as a 10 percent increase in the rate of job changes for younger work-
ers now as compared to earlier decades (Bernhardt, Morris, Handcock, and
Scott forthcoming). They also Wnd large declines in tenure for older, white
men in particular, the group most protected by internal labor markets.
For example, for men approaching retirement age (58–63) only 29 percent
had been with the same employer for ten years or more as compared to a
Wgure of 47 percent in 1969 (Ruhm 1995). The most recent studies Wnd that
the percentage of the workforce with long-tenure jobs, ten years or more,
declined slightly from the late 1970s through 1993 and then fell sharply
through the current period and are now at the lowest level in twenty years
(Farber 1997). The Wnding that tenure declined for managerial jobs is espe-
cially supportive of the arguments for the erosion of internal career systems
(Neumark, Polsky, and Hansen forthcoming).
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In most cases, the Wndings of declines in tenure are modest, but these
modest changes need to be assessed in the context of two caveats in addi-
tion to the general ones presented earlier. First, many of these studies are
comparing tenure in the 1990s to the 1980s. The 1981–83 recession was
the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression, while the period
after 1992 to 2000 was the greatest economic expansion since the Depres-
sion. In this context, the Wnding that jobs are only slightly less stable in the
1990s than in the 1980s is hardly evidence of stable careers. Second, the
declines in overall tenure for the workforce as a whole come despite the
fact that tenure for women has been rising because they are now less likely
to quit their jobs when they get married or have children (Wellington
1993). There is no evidence that the rising tenure of women has anything
to do with employers adapting or responding to this change in women’s
preferences.
Nor is the fact that geographic mobility has been reasonably stable any
evidence of stability in jobs. In fact, it may suggest the opposite, at least for
managerial jobs. Transferring employees around the corporation was a key
component in executive development programs, and the corporate interest
in relocating employees, as indicated by employer surveys, has been in
decline. The alternative to transferring employees is to Wll those vacancies
through outside hiring. Other survey results suggest that employees now
resist moving outside of their communities precisely because of the new
market-driven employment model. Their professional networks give them
the opportunity to Wnd a new job should they be dismissed, and they fear
moving away and having to search for a new position where those networks
do not apply (Furchgott 1996).
Job Security
A better alternative for assessing changes in the employment relationship
would be to look directly at job security rather than at proxies like tenure.
It is difWcult to measure job security directly except through changes in
employer policies. As late as the end of the 1970s, survey evidence from the
Conference Board indicated that management’s priorities in setting employ-
ment practices were to build a loyal, stable workforce. A decade later, how-
ever, by the end of the 1980s, that priority had clearly shifted to increasing
organizational performance and reducing costs (Furchgott 1996). The
most powerful evidence in this regard is another Conference Board survey
that Wnds more than two-thirds of the large employers in the sample report-
ing that they have changed their practice and no longer offer employment
security; only 3 percent said that they still offered job security to employees
(HR Executive Review 1997).
Employer decisions to end job security through downsizing is another
lens into the world of changing employment relationships. Cutting workers
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to reduce costs and improve Wnancial performance, not just to respond to
declines in business, is the essence of downsizing. It is a new phenomenon
that begins in the 1980s. The American Management Association (AMA)
surveyed its member companies about downsizing since 1990. They found
that the incidence of downsizing increased virtually every year until 1996 —
despite the economic expansion — when 48.9 percent of companies re-
ported them, a trivial decline from 50 percent the year before. Forty per-
cent had downsizing in two or more separate years over the previous six
(American Management Association 1996). Other surveys report roughly
similar rates of downsizing. The scale of these job cuts are unprecedented
in a period of economic expansion.
The causes of downsizing have also changed with a growing number of
companies reporting that they now result from internal management deci-
sions — restructuring (66 percent) and outsourcing (23 percent). Virtually
none now cite overall economic conditions as an explanation, and most of
the companies that cut are now proWtable in the year they are cutting.
Further, downsizing is no longer necessarily about shrinking the size of the
workforce. Thirty-one percent of those Wrms in the AMA surveys were actu-
ally adding and cutting workers at the same time in 1996, and the average
Wrm that had a downsizing was in fact growing by 6 percent (Furchgott
1996).This development suggests that Wrms are relying on the outside labor
market to restructure, dropping skills that are no longer needed and bring-
ing in new ones.
Data on workers who have been permanently displaced from their jobs
conWrms the fact that job security is declining and is now no longer depen-
dent on business cycles. The overall rate at which workers have been per-
manently displaced backed down a bit in the late 1980s from the peak of
the recession period, 1981–83 but then rose again — despite the economic
recovery — and jumped sharply through 1995. The rate at which workers
were thrown out of their jobs was about the same in 1993–95, a period of
signiWcant economic expansion and prosperity in the economy as a whole,
as compared to the 1981–83 recession (Farber 1998). It is difWcult to think
of more compelling evidence that the nature of the employment relation-
ship has changed than this. About 15 percent of the workforce saw their
jobs go forever during 1993–95. The cause of the job losses reported in
these surveys mirrors the developments in the Wrm surveys — shifting
away from economy or companywide reasons such as downturns in business
or plant closings toward eliminating particular positions associated with
restructuring.
Other manifestations of declining job security include the fact that job
losses now are much more likely than in previous decades to be perma-
nent; that dismissals for cause, such as poor performance, have increased
along with downsizing; and that the employees who were once largely
immune from business cycle related layoffs — not only white-collar but also
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older and more educated workers — have seen their rate of job loss rise.
Again, these reductions in security have occurred in a period of economic
expansion.
Wages
Changes in the wage structure within organizations is another aspect of the
change in employment relationships. One of the main functions of internal
labor markets is to create distinctive wage proWles that differ from market
rates in order to serve the internal goals of the organization. Job mobility
within the same organization tended to produce greater beneWts in the
form of higher wages and was seen in part as the result of a better match
between the attributes of the employees and the requirements of the jobs
as compared to job changes in the outside labor market, a testament to the
advantages of the internal labor market in allocating labor. By the early
1990s, however, there was no longer any advantage to the inside moves as
compared to those across employers (Wilk and Craig 1998). The steady
progression of wages based on seniority or tenure was one of the hallmarks
of internal systems. The apparent decline in the return to tenure with the
same employer is perhaps the most compelling evidence of the decline of
more traditional pay and employment relationships. Researchers study-
ing the semiconductor industry, for example, found a decline in the wage
premium paid to more experienced workers. Among the explanations are
that new technical skills are becoming more important, and those skills
are learned not inside the Wrm but outside, typically in higher education
(Brown 1994). In aggregate data, the returns to seniority — that is, tenure
with the same employer — have collapsed in recent years (Chauvain 1994).
Other studies Wnd a sharp decline in returns to seniority of about $3,000
annually between the 1970s and 1980s for workers with ten years of senior-
ity. The costs of job changing dropped dramatically; and workers who
changed jobs every other year saw almost the same earnings rise in the late
1980s as did those who kept the same job for ten years (Marcotte 1994).
Further, this effect varies depending on why one changes jobs. The proba-
bility that employees who quit would Wnd a job that offers a large pay raise
has increased by Wve percent, while the probability that those who were dis-
missed will suffer a large decline in their pay has risen by 17 percent over
the previous decade (Polsky 1999). These results suggest that a good, life-
time match between an employee and a single employer is becoming less
important in determining an employee’s long-term success. By default, what
must be becoming more important are factors outside of the relationship
with an individual employer, factors associated with the outside market.
Another hallmark of internal labor markets was that pay was assigned to
jobs rather than to individuals and that differences in pay were associated
with differences in jobs. Research suggests greater risk and more variance
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in individual earnings over time that cannot be accounted for by the usual
characteristics of jobs (Gottschalk and MofWtt 1994). Some part of the
greater variance may be because of a much stronger relationship between
individual performance and pay. Hay Associates, the compensation Wrm,
collects data from their clients on the pay increases associated with different
levels of individual performance as measured by performance evaluation
plans. In 1989, the increase associated with the highest level of performance
was 2.5 times larger than the increase associated with the lowest level. By
1993, that ratio had risen to a factor of four.16 A 1996 Towers Perrin survey
found that 61 percent of responding Wrms were using variable pay and that
27 percent of Wrms were considering the elimination of base pay increases
altogether so that the only increases in compensation would result from
performance contingent pay (O’Neil 1997). Data from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics Wnds that the percentage of employees eligible for bonuses rose
from 29 percent in 1989 to 39 percent in medium-size and large Wrms and
to 49 percent in small Wrms by the end of the 1990s (USBLS 1989–1997).
The change in contingent compensation has been especially great for exec-
utives. Bonuses as a share of total compensation rose more than 20 percent
from 1986 to 1992 (O’Shaughnessy, Levine, and Cappelli 1998). Contin-
gent pay erodes the importance of internal, administrative pay systems by
placing greater weight on factors that vary such as business and individual
performance.
Benefits
Whether employers are less likely to offer employee beneWts is an issue that
goes directly to the traditional question as to whether jobs protect employ-
ees from hardship. It says nothing, however, about whether employers are
offering greater commitments to employees or, indeed, about the nature
of the employment relationship. Employee beneWts are simply another form
of compensation that exists because most are tax-advantaged forms of com-
pensation and, in some cases, because employers can provide them more
cheaply than can employees. The biggest development in employee beneWts
in recent years has been “cafeteria-style” beneWts, which make the compen-
sation aspects of beneWts transparent by allowing employees to essentially
buy the combination of beneWts they want from a Wxed budget or cash them
in for wages. Employee beneWts end with employment, just as wages do. The
one prominent exception is pension plans which represent a continuing
obligation to employees — even if employment ends (at least for vested
employees) — and, as such, an indication of a more permanent obligation
by employers. 
As Jacoby notes in his chapter, pension plans have been on the decline;
but even more important than the decline in pension coverage has been the
shift in the nature of pensions from deWned beneWt plans, where workers
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earn the right to predetermined beneWt levels according to their years of
service, toward deWned contribution plans, where employers make Wxed
contributions to a retirement fund for each employee, especially 401(k)
programs whereby employees contribute directly to their retirement fund
(Ippolito 1995). With this shift, the employer no longer bears the risk of
guaranteeing a stream of beneWts. That problem now falls to the employee.
The employer’s obligations to the employee end with employment, a move
away from long-term relationships.
Contingent Work
Another aspect of changes in employment mentioned in Jacoby’s chapter
that is relevant to changes in career jobs, as opposed to good jobs, is the
extent of contingent work that is made up of temporary, part-time, and
self-employed help. Perhaps a better term for this category is nonstandard
work because it emphasizes the common characteristic of being some-
thing other than full-time employment. Whether these jobs are good jobs
as deWned above is difWcult to assess and may ultimately turn on whether
employees take them by choice or because they cannot get full-time, perma-
nent employment. The rise of nonstandard work suggests something about
the growing employer preference for variable as opposed to Wxed employ-
ment costs. It is fair to say that nonstandard work may no longer be grow-
ing, but it is also worth recognizing that most estimates indicate that it
already accounts for just under one-third of the jobs in the United States.17
It might be reasonable to include contracting out and vendors in this cate-
gory, at least from the perspective of the original Wrm, because they repre-
sent the movement of work that had been inside the Wrm at Wxed cost to
work that is now done outside the Wrm at variable cost. The outsourced jobs
may still be good jobs, of course, although they often represent signiWcantly
reduced career opportunities.18
Outside Hiring
The nail in the cofWn of the traditional employment relationship is the
greater use of outside hiring by employers. It is difWcult to assess the extent
of outside hiring, but one study that did so found a sizeable increase in the
proportion of employers who sought experienced workers for entry-level
jobs (Rynes, Orlitzky, and Bretz 1997). My examination of proprietary sur-
veys of employers Wnds them reporting a greater interest in outside hiring
to meet skill needs (Cappelli 1999). One interesting proxy for the growth of
outside hiring is the fact that the revenues from corporate recruiting Wrms
who perform outside searchers for companies tripled just during the mid
l990s (Cappelli 1999). Not only is there no evidence that employers are
making greater investments in their new hires, but the evidence that we have
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suggests that they are making substantially fewer investments, particularly
in the extent of training to learn new jobs (Constantine and Neumark 1997).
In my view, most of the economy is moving along a continuum toward
greater use of the outside labor market. Movement away from internalized
practices does not suggest that employers are necessarily headed toward
free agency. However, the set of industries that are well toward that model
is more than just the margins of the economy. Silicon Valley is often held up
as the example of open labor markets with high levels of mobility across
Wrms and little planned internal development. In this sense, it is not just
a geographic location but a metaphor for much of the entire high-tech sec-
tor across the entire country. Something like free agency now dominates
not only creative industries such as movies and television, but also much of
the investment industry. It has also come to professional service Wrms
(accounting, consulting, and law Wrms in particular), where promotion to
partner had meant a lifetime career at that Wrm. Now movement across
Wrms is common even for associates. Outside hiring may be more common
for higher-skilled employees because their higher value added makes search
and recruiting costs easier to recoup. But “poaching” (hiring away employ-
ees from competitors) is now a phenomenon for all jobs where labor is in
short supply. Call centers, for example, have been particularly subject to
retention problems from outside hiring. Even state beaches on the East
Coast have engaged in poaching lifeguards from each other.
When employers switch from internal promotions to outside hires, they
effectively shut down their own internal labor market by eliminating pro-
motion prospects. They also eviscerate the internal labor markets of com-
petitors because the investments made in those employees leave. Finally,
outside hiring shifts the attention of employers from inside the Wrm to the
network of potential employers outside the Wrm where more — and quite
likely better — career opportunities lie.
Will Tight Labor Markets
Bring Back Employee Protections?
The return of tight labor markets clearly does shift bargaining power back
toward the employees. That is one reason why we are seeing rising real
wages and increases in the reemployment rates of displaced workers. How-
ever, there is no evidence whatsoever that employees are using this oppor-
tunity to demand anything like a return to the older model of employment
relations. First, employees understand that promises about career paths
and long-term security are meaningless. Unless the changes in the business
environment outlined above are rolled back, it is difWcult to believe that any
promises of a return to previous arrangements would be credible. There
is also no practical way for employees to bargain for the terms of the old
model because there is no way to bind their employer to it (short of explicit
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employment contracts that employers are loath to sign). In tight labor mar-
kets, the last thing employees want is arrangements that would buffer them
from those markets and their beneWts. Second, evidence seems to suggest
that employees have already begun to adapt to this new world. Ninety-four
percent of employees in a recent survey reported that they believed that
they, and not their employer, were responsible for their own job security.
When asked what they wanted from employers in a different survey, the top
places went to development opportunities. Job security came out in the
middle of the list. Surveys of MBA students Wnd greater willingness to take
risks and little interest in the large corporations that may still offer the best
internal career paths.19
Not surprisingly, there is no evidence that employers are reverting to
anything like the traditional model of employment relationships. Clearly
there are companies such as SAS that continue to offer the old model. (It
is interesting, by the way, how often the companies that still offer job
security are privately held — not subject to the Wnancial pressures of the
investment community — and making products with some protection from
fast-changing competition.) However, Wnding continuing examples of the
old arrangements is no evidence of a return to those arrangements. There
are also many examples in this tight labor market of companies trying to
persuade their employees not to quit. But it is difWcult to Wnd any examples
where companies are offering any concrete promises about future relation-
ships. Every company that I have seen that wants to improve retention in
fact is interested in retaining key talent, not necessarily all employees. Every
one of these companies also says that they want to improve their ability to
hire from the outside, a prospect that undermines their own internal labor
market and cuts against the ability of other employers to retain employees.
New work systems such as team-based arrangements might be expected to
require greater investments in employees and continuity, but there is no
evidence that employers are making those investments (Osterman 1995).
Even where new work systems seem to require greater commitment from
employees, commitment does not require lifetime or even permanent jobs
as indicated by the studies showing that contingent workers are just as com-
mitted as full-time employees.20
Conclusions
The concern about the possible decline of good jobs began in the 1970s with
the long-term decline in real wages and accelerated with the restructuring
waves beginning in the early 1980s. Especially in the context of tight labor
markets in the late 1990s, it is probably true that the number of good jobs
in the economy, as traditionally deWned, is not falling and may even be ris-
ing. Other changes are underway, however, that undermine the traditional
notion of careers within the same organization. Overall job insecurity
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remains high because of factors such as the greater volatility of product
markets, the greater incidence of restructuring, and the pressures on Wrms
to divert resources from protecting employees toward shareholder value.
Outside hiring combined with reduced opportunities for internal promo-
tion helps shift careers from an inside the Wrm perspective to the outside
market. Careers and employee management more generally are increasingly
driven by the outside labor market.
Once these developments are underway, it is not within the power of an
individual employer to return to the older arrangements. Consider an em-
ployer who decides to return to more traditional arrangements with long-
term investments in employees, internal promotions, and lifetime careers.
Even if such a model made sense for the employer’s current context, it
would only work if competitors agree not to poach away valuable talent and
employees agree not to leave for what, at some point, would inevitably be
better offers than they have internally. Neither is likely. The belief that even
large companies will be able to offer employees better opportunities than
the vast sea of possibilities in the outside market can offer up is a chimera.
These new arrangements do create new sets of winners and losers. While
traditional arrangements sheltered employment from market pressures, the
new arrangements make the market the arbiter of labor market outcomes.
In slack labor markets, employers are able to push even more costs onto
employees while in tight labor markets, employees are able to extract more
rents from employees. Within the employee population, those with market-
able skills and the ability to manage their own careers have made out very
well; those without skills, with constraints on their mobility, and lacking
career management skills have suffered even more than in the past. These
developments may help account for rising inequality in outcomes, and
they no doubt will exacerbate that trend. In particular, those who have the
resources to invest in their own careers will have even greater advantages
over those who do not. 
It is not entirely clear what the public interest should be with respect to
these developments. Some employee groups that have lost protection from
the vagaries of the market clearly need protection from economic hardship.
Perhaps the most important change in the policy area is that white-collar
and managerial employees now suffer much the same insecurity as other
employees, albeit at higher initial salaries. What interventions would help
them is not so obvious. Traditional policy solutions of prohibiting undesir-
able outcomes, such as prohibiting layoffs along the lines of some European
policies, does not seem feasible in an environment where business Xexibil-
ity has been identiWed with the overall performance of the economy. 
An alternative approach, which I think is more sensible, is to reduce the
burdens associated with transitions between employers. These might include
making employee beneWts more portable so that employees do not lose
health care coverage or pensions when they switch employers; reforming
unemployment insurance, a program designed to accommodate temporary
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layoffs, to help assist employees who face permanent job loss (California,
for example, allows companies to draw on unemployment insurance funds
to retrain workers who are at risk of layoff ); providing much more sub-
stantive assistance for retraining employees who are displaced from jobs,
including greater access to education; moving away from economic assis-
tance based on employment outcomes, such as the minimum wage, and
toward other forms of assistance such as earned income tax credits.
One solution that I do not think is helpful is to expect employers to
solve the problem in the old way, to brand employers who do not provide
job security as “bad employers” and those that can provide some security as
“good employers.” Their differential ability to provide security is primarily
driven by objective characteristics such as the volatility of their product
market, changes in the boundaries of the Wrm, and the business strategies
of the employers, characteristics that have little to do with the moral char-
acter of the organization. This is not to say that there are not objection-
able and praiseworthy approaches to managing employees but simply that
such judgments are often very difWcult to make in practice. How about
employers who have lost protection from tight labor markets? Do they also
deserve help? As odd as this claim may sound, it is put forward in the pol-
icy arena — the argument to expand immigration for foreign workers in
information technology and other areas is essentially based on the claim
that employers need relief from tight labor markets. The challenges of man-
aging retention, developing skills, and directing a workforce without lifetime
commitment are real and require radical rethinking of the organization
(Cappelli 1999 is essentially about addressing these challenges.).
The rising power of markets is one of the most important developments
of our generation. Given that, it should be no surprise that the power of
labor markets is rising as well. The effects are likely to be profound, much
more complicated than the rise of either good jobs or career jobs, and no
doubt will be examined for decades to come.
Notes
An earlier version of this chapter appeared in California Management Review 42, 1
(Fall 1999), © 1999 Regents of the University of California. Reprinted by permission.
1. It is worth remembering in the context of this discussion that the research on
inequality did not reach a clear consensus that inequality had risen until a good ten
or Wfteen years after the trend was underway.
2. Other authors who use different criteria to evaluate good jobs, such as real
wages and work effort, report declines in at least some measures. See, for example,
the annual series by Mishel and Bernstein (various years).
3. See, for example, arguments such as those associated with Arthur and Rous-
seau (1996).
4. Not everyone thought that these arrangements were necessarily better for em-
ployees than those of the previous, more market-driven era because the employees
gave up control for security. In the former system, the argument goes, at least em-
ployees had more autonomy (Marglin 1974). 
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5. A detailed guide to these practices, which remained accurate until the early
1980s, is Slichter, Healy, and Livernash (1960). An analysis of the decline of that sys-
tem is Kochan, Katz, and McKersie (1984).
6. The classic study of managerial capitalism is Berle and Means (1932).
7. This case is argued persuasively in Mills (1988).
8. One might argue that such practices might actually beneWt shareholders by
improving company performance. The problem is that there is no solid evidence
for this position, and every anecdote of a company that appears to succeed in this
fashion can be countered by another anecdote about companies that do not.
9. This rise of these pressures from the investor community is perhaps the most
important development in the world of business in a generation (Useem, 1996).
10. Even if we focus just on the private sector and leave out the roughly 11 per-
cent of the workforce who are self-employed, in farming, or other jobs that do not
Wt the model of working for an “employer,” organizations still had to be a certain
size before it was efWcient to have systems of internal development and training,
job ladders, and other arrangements associated with long-term commitments. Seven
percent of private sector employees work in establishments with fewer than Wve
employees, and 44 percent are in establishments with fewer than one hundred. One
researcher calculated that organizations need a minimum of Wve hundred employ-
ees to make formal compensation systems feasible (see Smith 1988). Another re-
searcher argued that only about 40 percent of U.S. employees were in Wrms large
enough and old enough to even have a reputation in their community, something
that he saw as necessary to make implicit contracts that were behind internalized
employment practices operate (see Oi 1983). Even within those organizations, the
lifetime commitment model was generally a phenomenon for managerial workers
who typically constituted about one-Wfth of a company’s workforce. If we deWne the
workforce that ever had the lifetime, career-based employment system as manager-
ial employees in Wrms large enough to have reputations, a rough estimate would be
about 10 percent of the private sector workforce.
11. That the business press focus on these issues, then, might not be because they
are necessarily sensationalist but because the issues are especially pertinent to their
readers, the middle-class, managerial employees.
12. For an explicit comparison, see Cappelli (1992).
13. See Cappelli, Bassi, Knoke, Katz, Osterman, and Useem (1997).
14. See Polsky (1999) for this result. The other two studies are Bernhardt, Morris,
Handcock, and Scott (forthcoming) and Valetta (1996).
15. There are perhaps a dozen recent studies using at least four major data sets to
assess employee tenure. They are reviewed in Cappelli (1999). Even more recent
studies are discussed in Neumark (forthcoming).
16. Thanks to Steve Gross, then of Hay Associates, for providing me with these
unpublished Wgures in 1996.
17. Segal and Sullivan (1997). The estimates of temporary help in particular
count only employees working for agencies, but estimates that include temps work-
ing directly for employers might double the total number of temps, from 2 to 4 per-
cent of the workforce.
18. Consider, for example, a company that outsourced janitorial or other lower-
level jobs to a vendor. The janitors may still have full-time jobs, albeit now with a
vendor. However, the likelihood of being able to advance to any position outside of
janitorial work may well be reduced.
19. This material is reviewed in Cappelli (1999).
20. There are now many studies reporting this result, but the Wrst one appears to
be Pearce (1993).
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Are current employer practices qualitatively different from those of the
recent past? This is the issue dividing Peter Cappelli and myself. Unlike
Cappelli, I do not think that the institutions of the postwar U.S. labor mar-
ket have undergone a structural transformation, certainly nothing so dras-
tic as to warrant an obituary.
Social scientists regularly contest the nature of institutional change, as
in recent debates over the nation state, Nordic corporatism, collective bar-
gaining, and superpower hegemony. Typically the debaters divide into two
camps. On one side are the saltationists: those who see institutional change
representing a break or rupture with the past. Here there is fascination with
punctuated equilibrium models and other metaphors of discontinuous
change. On the other side are the gradualists: those who see change occur-
ring adaptively and being accommodated by existing institutions.1
Each side in these debates has its virtues and vices. The gradualists are
sensitive to structural continuity and to path dependence, although this
breeds a conservatism that causes them to miss historical turning points.
The great neoclassical economist, Alfred H. Marshall, was a gradualist whose
marginalism caused him to declare “Natura non facit saltum” (nature
makes no leaps). The problem is, sometimes it does. Saltationists are alert
to these transitions and quick to see fresh patterns. They also, however,
have a tendency to give recent events more weight than a long-term per-
spective would warrant. There lies the nub of my differences with Cappelli
(this volume).
To understand my position, we need to go back to the late 1960s, when
economists concerned with poverty developed a labor-market taxonomy
known as the “dual labor market” model. In this model, the secondary
sector was comprised of jobs that were easy to learn, paid relatively low
wages, and offered few rewards to tenure. Some of these were full-time
jobs; others were part-time or temporary positions. Secondary workers were
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disproportionately young, female, and nonwhite, with high turnover rates
(Doeringer and Piore 1971; Edwards et al. 1975).
The primary sector was the locus classicus of the internal labor market,
characterized by use of administrative principles to guide labor allocation
and by strong attachments between employers and employees. These attach-
ments caused the formation of Wrm-speciWc human capital. To retain and
to motivate employees, companies offered wages and beneWts that rose
with seniority. Incumbents were favored over outsiders for vacancies. The
employment relationship was maintained over time, although the strength
of the tie varied by occupational tier.
The primary sector’s upper tier was composed of salaried executive,
managerial, and professional employees. Except in catastrophic situations
like the Great Depression, these employees had Japanese-style lifetime jobs.
The lower tier was Wlled with hourly blue-collar, clerical, and sales employ-
ees. Their jobs offered fewer rewards to tenure than the upper tier (as in the
distinction between annual salaries and hourly wages), but they did provide
a fair degree of stability. The big contrast in lower-tier jobs was between
those in the union sector, where income security was emphasized, and those
in the nonunion sector, where employment security was more prevalent.
During business downturns, the union sector utilized a layoff-rehire sys-
tem tied to seniority and subsidized by unemployment insurance and pri-
vate beneWts. The nonunion sector was more likely to respond to downturns
by cutting hours and compensation, or by transferring employees. Because
of these differences, layoff rates in the 1960s were two to four times higher
in the union sector, and unionized workers were about 50 percent more
likely to experience temporary layoffs. Unionized workers also were more
likely to experience layoffs than their counterparts in Europe or Japan
( Jacoby 1997). While permanent mass layoffs were rare during the postwar
boom, they did sometimes occur. Typically unions handled them through
transfers of senior members, or, if this was not an option, through a sev-
erance pay plan. Like temporary layoffs, severance plans revealed labor’s
preference for income, rather than job, security. As observers noted in
1960, this preference demonstrated “a basic conservatism in the American
labor movement” because it allowed unions to “avoid the necessity of bar-
gaining over such essential management decisions as production schedules,
capital improvement plans, and plant location (Slichter et al. 1960).
In short, the antediluvian world had a certain structure and logic. The
least stable jobs were in the secondary labor market, where weak attach-
ments resulted in low tenure and high turnover. In the primary sector, the
most stable jobs were held by managers and executives; lower-tier primary
workers enjoyed many upper-tier perquisites, albeit to a lesser degree (and,
in the case of unionized workers, with a greater emphasis on income secu-
rity). Pay and employment levels Xuctuated less than market conditions;
when employers made pay and allocative decisions, they gave heavy weight
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to organizational factors (like seniority, equity, and morale) and not only to
market considerations. Risks that might otherwise be borne by employees
were absorbed by the employer.
Of course, the fact that employers operated internal labor markets in this
fashion had everything to do with self-interest and not benevolence, except
to the extent benevolence constituted a form of enlightened self-interest.
That employers chose to shoulder risk for employees was the result of an
interplay between efWciency factors (recouping investments in employees
and providing incentives for employee effort); the rise of modern manage-
ment (including professional personnel managers and systematic attention
to employee psychology); social norms; and various external forces (rang-
ing from union pressure to law to tax incentives).2
So where do Cappelli and I disagree? We differ on four main issues: the
persistence of the labor market’s pre-1980 structure; the manner in which
this structure has adapted to the post-1980 environment; the contrast
between managers and other occupational groups; and the interpretation
of data.
The Pre-1980 Model
The model sketched above remains a good Wrst approximation to the con-
temporary labor market. Employers in the primary sector — the focus of
my essay — still face a similar set of incentives and pressures, what I referred
to in my essay as the “organizational realities of managing a workforce.”
True, some of the underpinnings to internal labor markets have grown
weaker, notably labor unions. However, there also are new forces that
are raising the return on employee retention. The economy increasingly is
being driven by competition based on creativity, skill, and relationships.
While some companies are content to cross-fertilize an industry through
the turnover of skilled employees, as in parts of Silicon Valley, most employ-
ers prefer a proprietary approach. Hence they make strenuous efforts to
manage and retain their intellectual capital (Pfeffer 1998; Stewart 1997).
To reduce the cost of these efforts in a riskier world, employers rely on a
core-periphery model, in which secondary jobs — temporary, part time,
and others — are used as a buffer to stabilize core jobs and as a screening
device to select future core employees. Secondary workers are employed
by outside contractors or by the primary employer (a distinction that has
legal ramiWcations, as Microsoft recently discovered). These new forms of
sectoral articulation are a change from the older version of autonomous
dual markets. However, they are consistent with the preservation of career-
type jobs.
How large and persistent has been the growth of secondary or nonstan-
dard positions? Cappelli and I agree that nonstandard jobs have not been
growing since the mid-1990s. Where we differ is in our assessment of their
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growth before then. Currently, of the roughly 30 percent of the employed
who hold nonstandard jobs, over two-thirds are part-time workers, a group
whose share of employment has not changed since the early 1970s. The
remainder consists of workers in “alternative employment arrangements”:
independent contractors and consultants (6.7 percent); on-call workers (1.6
percent); temporary help workers (1 percent); and workers provided by
contract Wrms (0.6 percent). This is a motley group. The independent con-
tractors and consultants are relatively educated; one-third possess college
degrees, a higher proportion than traditional workers. Only 4 percent con-
sider their jobs likely to last for less than a year and 84 percent prefer their
arrangement over a traditional job. Workers provided by contract Wrms
resemble independent contractors; they tend to be educated and consider
their jobs to be stable. On the other hand, temporary help workers and on-
call workers are disproportionately young, female, and less educated. Most
do not think their jobs will last and nearly 60 percent would prefer a tradi-
tional job. Thus an upper bound on the increase since the 1970s of non-
standard jobs that are undesired and unstable is less than three percent of
employment, a change but not a sea change (USBLS 1997, 1998b).
Adaptation not Extinction
It is true that the economic environment is different now than in the 1970s,
due to technological innovation and the intensiWcation of domestic and
global competition. However, the new environment has not led to the death
of internal labor markets and long-term jobs, such as they were (and are).
Rather — and this is the central point of my essay — internal labor markets
have adapted to change by shifting risk and uncertainty from the Wrm to
the employee. Employees today are bearing more risk — including the risk
of job loss — but are doing so within structures that have remained stable
over time. When we look at the kind of workers who held primary jobs
in the past — adult high-school and college graduates — the proportion
reporting more than ten years’ tenure with the same employer was 42 per-
cent in 1979 versus 37 percent in 1996. Despite job losses and restructur-
ing since 1980, long-term attachments are only slightly less prevalent today
(Farber 1997b).
Real wages have declined for some workers, especially the less educated.
However, this in itself is not inconsistent with a world of long-term jobs
and risk-sheltering by employers. In fact, to a degree the two phenomena
are related: Some workers have traded (or been forced to trade) lower real
wages for job security and the maintenance of beneWts; other workers —
particularly managers, a point I will return to — have enjoyed rising wages
at the expense of job security and some job-related beneWts. The real para-
dox of today’s labor market is the coexistence of job loss and long-term em-
ployment, sometimes within the same organization. This causes job losses
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to have a ripple effect, making survivors work harder and worry more. How-
ever, the survivors, while bearing more risk, continue to hold long-term jobs
whose pay and working conditions remain heavily inXuenced by organiza-
tional considerations.
Managers and Other Occupational Groups
Cappelli gives a lot of weight to the experiences of managerial and execu-
tive employees. In fact, his argument about the death of career jobs is really
about the collapse of job security for managers, and his evidence of a shift
from organizations to markets is weighted heavily to managerial phenom-
ena, such as executive compensation and careers.
Without doubt, managerial work has changed drastically in many Wrms.
Much of the decline in aggregate job stability in the 1980s and 1990s was
concentrated among long-tenure males in managerial occupations. Prior to
those years, managers were an extremely privileged group. In large compa-
nies, they had Japanese-style lifetime employment, generous perquisites,
and insulation from market forces. As William H. Whyte observed in 1956,
the Organization Man believed “his relationship with The Organization is
to be for keeps” because if he was “loyal to the company . . . the company
would be loyal” to him ( Jacoby 1985: 279). It’s not an accident that Whyte
wrote his book in the 1950s. The multidivisional or M-form model took
hold after World War II, bringing with it an enormous demand for middle
managers to hold together increasingly complex and differentiated cor-
porations. The 1950s also saw American companies become increasingly
multinational, with a rising rate of foreign investment and consequent need
for managerial expertise. At the same time, there was a scarcity of talent.
MBA programs had not taken off yet, and the cohort born in the Depres-
sion (who were graduating from college in the 1950s) was relatively small.
As sociologist Glen Elder has shown (1974), these children of the Depres-
sion were obsessed with security, and big American companies were happy
to provide it. The result was a golden age for American managers. To
some extent the party was paid for by shareholders, who had ceded power
to managers. Writing in 1959, Adolph Berle called this “power without
property” and dubbed it “a new development in American political econ-
omy” (1959).3
In the late 1980s, there was a sea change for managers. Managerial hier-
archies were gutted as mergers, information technology, and corporate
decentralization reduced the need for middle managers. Further down the
hierarchy, self-managing teams took the place of Wrst-line supervisors. Mean-
while, MBAs graduating in the 1980s were a different breed, too young to
have been touched by the depression and different in other respects from
their elders (Mills 1987; Osterman 1996). They were drawn to expand-
ing sectors like Silicon Valley, Wall Street, and management consulting —
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places where the upside pay potential was high but where careers were more
market oriented than under the postwar model.
Nevertheless, recent evidence indicates that the corporate pendulum is
starting to swing back to a concern with managerial retention and devel-
opment. In most big companies, managerial downsizing is now a fait
acccompli. That fact, coupled with tightening labor markets and shifting
demographics, is causing a new shortage of managerial talent. “Brain
Drain,” the cover story of a recent issue of Business Week (1999), explains
that with the leading edge of the baby boom generation nearing retirement,
companies are “moving decisively to hang on to their most experienced
workers,” including executives over Wfty, a group that “until recently was
being rushed out the door.”
What about nonmanagerial occupations? This is a huge and diverse
group, including blue-collar jobs; service and sales positions; semiprofes-
sionals like technicians, teachers, programmers, and nurses; and traditional
professions such as law, engineering, and accounting. Most of these occu-
pations remain situated in internal labor markets. While these jobs were
never as stable as managerial positions, they were hardly a spot market. In
1979, before restructuring got under way, the proportion of blue-collar
workers with tenure over ten years was precisely the same as it was for man-
agers (46 percent); clerical employees were only slightly lower (39 percent;
see Farber 1997b).
The big change for blue-collar jobs came in the early 1980s, when there
was a wave of layoffs and plant closures that caused enormous pain in
affected communities. However, the contraction of blue-collar jobs failed to
receive the sort of publicity that occurred a decade later when managerial
jobs were on the block. As I have written elsewhere, “only in the 1990s, when
professionals and managers were the ones at risk, did the politically inXu-
ential middle class begin to feel threatened and the media take notice.”
Another reason blue-collar layoffs did not attract more notice was their con-
sistency with labor’s earlier decision to favor income security over job secu-
rity. As a former Steelworkers ofWcial admitted in the early 1980s, “We may
have backed ourselves into a corner by settling for income security rather
than dealing with the immense complexities of fashioning job security
arrangements.” ( Jacoby 1997: 257, 261). 
Since then, however, unions have painfully shifted their emphasis to job
security, while U.S. manufacturers have made an equally painful transition
to quality production. Now there is a new regard for high-performance work
practices such as self-managed teams, job rotation, and problem-solving
groups. The use of these practices increased rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s.
Cappelli is skeptical that such practices are leading to greater training
investments and that they require enhanced employment security. However,
recent studies by Paul Osterman and others Wnd training investments to be
substantially higher in establishments utilizing high-performance practices.
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Moreover, use of these practices is associated with having fewer contin-
gent employees and less outsourcing. That is, high-performance practices
solidify the jobs of core employees, sometimes at the expense of manager-
ial positions. Companies adopting these practices have fewer managerial
employees and their managerial ranks grew at a slower rate in the 1990s.
This is one reason why, since the mid-1980s, blue-collar job displacement
rates have steadily dropped while those for managers have steadily risen
(although managerial rates remain at levels well below those of manual
workers; Cole 1999; Osterman 1999; Erickson and Jacoby 1998; Kletzer
1998).4
In service and sales occupations, mobility patterns and job-security mea-
sures both show that internal labor markets are being preserved, even as
pay becomes more differentiated by market segment. While such occupa-
tions continue to have lower tenure levels than managerial positions, they
are relatively stable. The fraction of sales and service workers with tenure
over ten years held steady between 1979 and 1996, unlike managerial
tenure (Batt 1999; Frenkel et al. 1999: 105–6; Farber 1997b).5
As for the fast-growing semiprofessional and technical occupations, their
skill and education levels are helping to drive the economy. Yet as sociolo-
gist Charles Heckscher (1988) points out, “they are semi in that their status
is bound up with their place in a particular company, not with universal
standards that go beyond the Wrm” (69). That is, their skills are partially
Wrm-speciWc and this fact, combined with high demand for their skills, has
kept their displacement rates since 1981 lower and less variable than for
managerial employees (Kletzer 1998; Frenkel et al. 1999).6
Tenure Data
I agree with Cappelli’s (this volume) assessment that the “Wndings of de-
clines in tenure are modest.” His caveat — that many of these studies are
comparing tenure in the recessionary 1980s to tenure in the expansionist
1990s — does not apply to most of the studies we cite, which either use pre-
1981 basepoints or adopt sampling and other controls for business-cycle
effects. His second caveat is that rising tenure for women is not due to
changes in employer policy but is a statistical artifact: the result of more
women not quitting their jobs when they get married. However, the fact is
that the rise in female tenure, although modest, is robust and persists even
when demographic controls are applied to the tenure data. One of the
major growth areas for corporate welfare activity in the 1990s has been
“work and family” programs that attempt to accommodate women’s career
aspirations by making it easier for working women to be mothers. Employ-
ers have been spurred to do more in this area partly as a result of the 1993
Family and Medical Leave Act, although efforts started before then. The
programs can be faulted for delivering less than they promise, but they are
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more than Xuff. Hard dollars are being spent on Xexible spending accounts
that reimburse employees for childcare expenses, on greater amounts of
paid time for personal and sick leave, and on direct childcare (although
this is less prevalent than other programs). The evidence shows that these
expenditures are affecting women’s career decisions (Hofferth 1996).7
Job Attachment Data
True, tenure tells only part of the story and we need to look at other data
from which we can infer job attachment. The problem is that these data
are more ambiguous than the tenure data. Studies based on the CPS show
stability of retention rates over the 1980s and early 1990s; those based on
panel data are more diverse, with some showing a decline in retention rates
and others no evidence of change. Another approach is to separately exam-
ine involuntary and voluntary (quits) mobility. One would expect a rising
proportion of involuntary separations to make workers feel less secure,
even if total separations have not changed. Here too, some studies Wnd
increases over time in the proportion of separations that are involuntary;
others do not.8 One could attribute the lack of consensus to the shortcom-
ings of labor economics, or conclude, as I do, that the Wndings are ambigu-
ous because changes in job attachment have been modest.
Other studies look at job loss rates using data from the Displaced Work-
ers Survey. The DWS is problematic because there have been changes over
time in question wording and survey design. In his analyses of the data
through 1995, Farber (1997a, 1998) has made heroic efforts to control for
these problems. Farber Wnds that, until the 1993–95 period, adjusted job
loss rates had a strong cyclical pattern, rising during recessionary periods
(1981–93, 1989–91) and falling during expansions. The only exception is
1993–95, when job loss rates failed to decline despite the beginnings of
what has become a sustained expansion. If Cappelli is right, then the mid-
1990s mark the start of an historic shift in job-loss patterns. However, it is
also possible that the huge job losses of the mid-1990s were one-time events
not likely to recur. The mid-1990s recovery was exceptionally feeble; un-
employment barely fell and productivity was weak. Only after the mid-1990s
did the expansion pick up steam. Indeed, the most recent DWS data show
job displacement declining since the mid-1990s. While the number of dis-
placed workers is not small — 3.6 million individuals from 1995 to 1997 —
it is 15 percent lower than the number displaced in 1993–95. Also, reem-
ployment is occurring more quickly than in the mid-1990s, as one would
expect given the recent strength of the labor market.
We do need to supplement these aggregate data with analyses of partic-
ular Wrms, both those that are downsizing and those that are expanding.
On the former, the Watson Wyatt data on large companies with shrinking
employment Wnds no evidence that mid-career employees have been singled
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out in downsizing decisions. Consistent with the logic of internal labor
markets, the impact of downsizing is still borne by junior workers, and there
is no evidence that Wrms are substituting junior for mid-career employ-
ees. Moreover, these large but downsizing Wrms continue to have higher
retention rates than the labor market average. “From a purely statistical
standpoint, a worker in the early 1990s had higher odds of staying with [a
shrinking Wrm in the Wyatt sample] than they would have had in any job
picked at random.” (Allen, Clark and Schieber 1999).
As for companies with job gains, the Wyatt data show that these Wrms
had higher retention rates than those that were shrinking — not only for
junior employees but also for those with substantial seniority (over twenty
years) — a Wnding that suggests that internal labor markets are endur-
ing. True, some of these companies are privately held, which gives them
freedom to do things that other Wrms can not. However, ownership is not
destiny. There are plenty of publicly held growth companies oriented to
employee retention. Even in the high-technology sector, such Wrms — like
upstart Inktomi and giant Microsoft — pride themselves on being “sticky”
employers (at least of their core employees). Furthermore, publicly held
companies sometimes offer more security and risk sheltering than do pri-
vate companies. David I. Levine et al. (1999) point out that Wal-Mart’s
910,000 employees are “buffered from the external market in ways similar
to the traditional internal labor market, particularly as compared to the
Mom & Pop stores they displaced.”
Pay Data
Not only stable employment, but wages that rise with seniority are another
characteristic feature of internal labor markets. The single most compre-
hensive study of returns to tenure Wnds that these returns not only have per-
sisted over the period 1975–91, but have actually risen slightly. The picture
for young workers is mixed: returns to tenure have fallen for those hold-
ing jobs less than eighteen months but have risen for those holding jobs
for nineteen months or more (Altonji and Williams 1997; Bernhardt et al.
1998, Teulings and Hartog 1998).9 Other types of market-sheltered wage
practices also are not eroding. Employer wage premiums have remained
stable in the 1980s and 1990s. Also, the compensation practices of large
and small Wrms are at least as different in the 1990s as they were in the late
1970s. Big Wrms continue to pay more and their occupational wage struc-
tures have not converged with smaller Wrms. All of this suggests the contin-
ued existence of pay structures based on organizational considerations
(Levine et al. 1999; Belman and Levine 2001). 
It is true that there has been a movement in recent years toward basing pay
more heavily on individual and organizational performance. However, the
shift has been monetarily most important for managers. For nonmanagerial
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employees, performance-based pay, while more prevalent, still affects only
a tiny fraction of total compensation. Conversely, job characteristics remain
an important determinant of pay. Wage inequality among people with the
same job title in the same organization changed very little in the 1980s
and 1990s. Also, the use of formal job evaluation plans has increased over
the last Wve years, further evidence that job characteristics still matter for
pay setting (Levine et al. 1999).
Conclusion
Most adults continue to be employed in long-term jobs situated in internal
labor markets, although they are more exposed to market forces than thirty
years ago. Shifting risk to employees is a sign that internal labor markets
are adapting to a more turbulent environment, not that they are dead. Man-
agers and executives have experienced major changes in career patterns
and pay practices, more so than other groups. To what extent those changes
will endure in coming years is, however, an open question.
None of this is to deny that segments of the labor force are experiencing
leaner and meaner arrangements. Risk-shifting may sound bland but it does
mean more uncertainty and stress for affected employees. For now, the tight
labor market has taken the edge off these changes. The general mood is
optimistic, much as in the late 1920s, when overall prosperity was combined
with sectoral dislocations and risk-shifting in response to market turbu-
lence. Hopefully, history is merely rhyming and will not repeat itself.
Notes
An earlier version of this chapter appeared in California Management Review 42, 1
(Fall 1999), © 1999 Regents of the University of California. Reprinted by permission.
1. See, for example, Ohmae (1995) versus Wade (1996); Lange et al. (1995);
Erickson and Kuruvilla (1998); Brilmayer (1994) versus Steel (1995). 
2. On the rise of internal labor markets, see Jacoby (1985).
3. See Chandler, (1962); Tsurumi (1977).
4. One of Osterman’s troubling Wndings is that use of high-performance prac-
tices in 1992 is positively associated with higher layoffs Wve years down the road,
except in unionized establishments. Yet more research needs to be done on this
important issue, because the model can’t tell whether the layoffs are a result of
productivity gains being appropriated by nonunion Wrms or of declining sales for
those Wrms.
5. The picture for clerical jobs is decidedly mixed: job losses and insecurity
for some; higher skill levels and new opportunities for others (Herzenberg et al.
1998).
6. One might argue that the relevant approach is not to look at occupations but
at education levels. Yet long-term jobs (over twenty years) are as prevalent for those
with twelve or fewer years of education as they are for those with baccalaureate and
advanced degrees. Cutting the tenure data at 10+ rather than 20+ does show college
graduates being more likely than the less educated to hold long-term jobs. However,
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the same advantage existed twenty years ago, before the turmoil in the labor market.
Similarly, four-year job retention rates fell in the 1980s for high-school dropouts
and high-school graduates relative to college graduates, but ten-year retention rates
for college graduates showed a slight decrease relative to the less educated (Farber
1997b; Diebold et al. 1997).
7. Earlier that year Motorola announced that it was opening onsite childcare cen-
ters at several of its semiconductor manufacturing plants (Wall Street Journal, 1999).
8. For a review of these studies, see Allen et al. (1999) and Bansak and Raphael
(1998).
9. The Chauvin study cited by Cappelli is based on manufacturing managers dur-
ing the period 1979–83, not the best sample for assessing aggregate or long-term
trends.
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